Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934923AbeAOMrC (ORCPT + 1 other); Mon, 15 Jan 2018 07:47:02 -0500 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:49512 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S966541AbeAOMq6 (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jan 2018 07:46:58 -0500 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Andy Lutomirski , Boris Ostrovsky , Borislav Petkov , Brian Gerst , Dave Hansen , David Laight , Denys Vlasenko , Eduardo Valentin , "H. Peter Anvin" , Josh Poimboeuf , Juergen Gross , Linus Torvalds , Peter Zijlstra , Will Deacon , aliguori@amazon.com, daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at, hughd@google.com, keescook@google.com, Ingo Molnar , David Woodhouse Subject: [PATCH 4.9 69/96] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 13:35:08 +0100 Message-Id: <20180115123409.977498324@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.15.1 In-Reply-To: <20180115123404.270241256@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180115123404.270241256@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Thomas Gleixner commit a89f040fa34ec9cd682aed98b8f04e3c47d998bd upstream. Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented ways to exploit that. The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime conditional. Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled. Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be made later. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -316,5 +316,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */ #define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */ #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */ +#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -882,6 +882,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st } setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); + + /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */ + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE); + fpu__init_system(c); }