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Date:   Thu, 18 Jan 2018 12:24:31 -0600
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
        Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 23/35] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code
Message-ID: <20180118182431.xvmk6kzxpzu43b43@treble>
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On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 06:12:36PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 18/01/2018 18:08, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > On 01/18/2018 08:37 AM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> >>>
> >>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> >>> @@ -3932,6 +3932,7 @@
> >>>  			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
> >>>  			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
> >>>  			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
> >>> +			ibrs		  - Intel: Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
> >> Are there plans to add spectre_v2=ibrs_always to prevent SMT-based
> >> attacks?
> > 
> > What does "ibrs_always" mean to you?

Maybe ibrs_always isn't the best name.  Basically we need an option to
protect user-user attacks via SMT.

It could be implemented with IBRS=1, or STIBP, or as part of the
mythical IBRS_ATT.

Maybe a 'user_smt' option, which could be appended to existing
'retpoline' or 'ibrs' options?  Like spectre_v2=retpoline,user_smt or
spectre_v2=ibrs,user_smt?

> > There is a second bit in the MSR (STIBP) that is intended to keep
> > hyperthreads from influencing each-other.  That is behavior is implicit
> > when IBRS is enabled.

Does this bit exist yet?  I've never seen any patches for it.

> Yeah, I think we should have a mode to always leave that enabled, or
> always set IBRS=1.
> 
> > I think ibrs_always *should* probably be kept to refer to the future
> > CPUs that can safely leave IBRS enabled all the time.
> 
> Is that "safely" or "without throwing performance down the drain"?
> 
> Does "always IBRS=1" *hinder* the mitigation on existing processor, as
> long as you reset IBRS=1 on kernel entry and vmexit?  Or is it just slow?

Yes, enquiring minds want to know...

-- 
Josh