Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
From:   KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
        Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
        Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        x86@kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support
Date:   Sat, 20 Jan 2018 20:22:51 +0100
Message-Id: <1516476182-5153-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

Start using the newly-added microcode features for speculation control on both
Intel and AMD CPUs to protect against Spectre v2.

This patch series covers interrupts, system calls, context switching between
processes, and context switching between VMs. It also exposes Indirect Branch
Prediction Barrier MSR, aka IBPB MSR, to KVM guests.

TODO:

- Introduce a microcode blacklist to disable the feature for broken microcodes.
- Restrict/Unrestrict the speculation (by toggling IBRS) around VMExit and
  VMEnter for KVM and expose IBRS to guests.

Ashok Raj (1):
  x86/kvm: Add IBPB support

David Woodhouse (1):
  x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure

KarimAllah Ahmed (1):
  x86: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing

Thomas Gleixner (4):
  x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB
  x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context
    switch
  x86/speculation: Add inlines to control Indirect Branch Speculation
  x86/idle: Control Indirect Branch Speculation in idle

Tim Chen (3):
  x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable
    process
  x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch
    Speculation
  x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                        |  73 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                       |  35 ++++-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S                |  21 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h                    |  14 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            |  54 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 183 +++++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                       |  14 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                              |  14 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                              |   4 +
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                               |  21 ++-
 12 files changed, 359 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)


Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org

-- 
2.7.4