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Date:   Wed, 24 Jan 2018 15:03:48 +0100 (CET)
From:   Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
cc:     Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
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        Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, x86@kernel.org,
        thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select
 Spectre v2 mitigation
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On Wed, 24 Jan 2018, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:

> > > I just thought since you were already using modversions in enterprise 
> > > distros already, that adding it there would be the simplest.
> > 
> > The patch as-is introduces immediate modversion mismatch between 
> > retpolined kernel and non-retpolined module, making each and every one 
> > fail to load.
> 
> Good, the patch works then, because I thought that not loading
> non-retpolined modules in a kernel that was built with retpoline was the
> goal here.

No, we do not want to break loading of externally-built modules just 
because they might contain indirect calls.

Warning in such situations / tainting the kernel / reporting "might be 
vulnerable" in sysfs should be the proper way to go.

retpolines are not kernel ABI (towards modules) breaker, so let's not 
pretend it is.

Thanks,

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs