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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 53/60] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL
Date:   Mon,  5 Feb 2018 10:23:26 -0800
Message-Id: <20180205182216.639155003@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Darren Kenny darren.kenny@oracle.com

commit af189c95a371b59f493dbe0f50c0a09724868881

Fixes: 117cc7a908c83 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
- * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {