Received: by 10.223.185.116 with SMTP id b49csp3627792wrg; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 05:22:04 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x227FM8rzZJ0PUCwk0F10kB9ljG+7OoNerwh54c6lONXyYQ1b7xxhpdr+LYXrdEA9DBvk01MH X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:43e4:: with SMTP id j91-v6mr1094704pld.153.1518528124262; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 05:22:04 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1518528124; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=qA+UEYpm7UopAhflD/ZCL57lfmUpUIRxaUV3k5LbXdDED+z9GSlC0sMEbxHi5aN2X5 yK9JLgaJxRhOqoL8AvHiCVnr44XLkgPgATh1kNM9EJ93cJe3TmhRFrGv1nN7KlgdmHfd u34jOPfnpGmWwtx9Pwkb1INloZydDyI8m1VeVfDWZbg+sGK06cDTeOXORx/YH7xt6MJk +8wMDSxWmVhzZIhXrEOeuL5N52r0xctgC2tLjC88iDzSs8VknShFb97LInY8oXuzip06 GCqQAufeyPTberVnYucNCI0D+VU812Dj8/MSjjZ4lLXR6B5kxfC0wyxajRz23v3PETiY a29Q== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:mime-version:user-agent:references :message-id:in-reply-to:subject:cc:to:from:date :arc-authentication-results; bh=jUXqnYnwYjcLVXA67eXLAXHfZ2+UtZTa7IIxoA8MII0=; b=PZtG39h/Pt7gTfUlW0uLSwOQ4ebcBf8/27DnkpOFFd/bpHehN51d9hI+Klt5mrP/rO Vy6mnjxhgtiypQj4oiCJR+bl1DYviTuszLzv62kTSDVWms/ySQHkfCiOorT1NS1l4lUM WQu7R+LP5UmL4aPeKnvTAKbjXtlAXswZ6S4zYGK+3E3uG6/Qs33V2kV+0+3o6M0K/hlc FKwRLi7hettzRG8yul4L0LW75isqHlyQGhGnQoB3BI2q8pyfZKXvqzMuI9a1BmUT5urn 68JTykAEGPJnIszdvtN3GSPQ4Vj67u/T8lAHkRAnEeFVhQEdOWPU9Gm5ao1zpX3loEka WVSg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id s24si1389145pfe.226.2018.02.13.05.21.48; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 05:22:04 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S935263AbeBMNVC (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 13 Feb 2018 08:21:02 -0500 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([146.0.238.70]:50535 "EHLO Galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S935174AbeBMNVB (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Feb 2018 08:21:01 -0500 Received: from hsi-kbw-5-158-153-52.hsi19.kabel-badenwuerttemberg.de ([5.158.153.52] helo=nanos.tec.linutronix.de) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1elaSt-0001u5-2Y; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 14:17:43 +0100 Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 14:21:03 +0100 (CET) From: Thomas Gleixner To: Pavel Machek cc: Tom Lendacky , x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors In-Reply-To: <20180212152630.GD13962@amd> Message-ID: References: <20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> <20180212152630.GD13962@amd> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (DEB 202 2017-01-01) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 12 Feb 2018, Pavel Machek wrote: > On Tue 2017-12-26 23:43:54, Tom Lendacky wrote: > > AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel > > page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture > > does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that > > access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode > > when that access would result in a page fault. > > > > Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting > > the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI > > is set. > > PTI was originally meant to protect KASLR from memory leaks, before > Spectre was public. I guess that's still valid use on AMD cpus? The KASLR attacks against which PTI protects are not based on a memory leak. The KASLR attacks are revealing the kernel virtual address space w/o revealing any data. Quite some of those attacks can be mitigated via PTI, but only some of the attacks work on AMD CPUs. The bulk (and easy to conduct) attacks do not work work on AMD CPUs due to the same reason why Meltdown does not work. Thanks, tglx