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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id i187si1639048pfe.384.2018.02.14.05.47.51; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 05:48:05 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@amazon.co.uk header.s=amazon201209 header.b=DT3kuXLP; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=amazon.co.uk Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1030554AbeBNNqE (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 14 Feb 2018 08:46:04 -0500 Received: from smtp-fw-4101.amazon.com ([72.21.198.25]:40868 "EHLO smtp-fw-4101.amazon.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1030488AbeBNNoz (ORCPT ); Wed, 14 Feb 2018 08:44:55 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=amazon.co.uk; i=@amazon.co.uk; q=dns/txt; s=amazon201209; t=1518615895; x=1550151895; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references: mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=EBRV/ZqV1x5dg+wFIx9xHwUXNSiVnpngcseBgF5B+Hc=; b=DT3kuXLPYWpNIA6/2E66Q7k1+LbaHx8Rn4HhxGQ51vo7zE39As1yyjae Xdd3oRWtZFcHori0uH1PyrPSGcW1qF6JDofsTPn5YpR8i77Scq9WnKfFp 9z1izIJSi+c1FuIepkQQjsPku1Pa4a91QAS9R6RvM/ZfkAzft06NWqJFR 0=; X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.46,512,1511827200"; d="scan'208";a="708104510" Received: from iad6-co-svc-p1-lb1-vlan3.amazon.com (HELO email-inbound-relay-1d-2c665b5d.us-east-1.amazon.com) ([10.124.125.6]) by smtp-border-fw-out-4101.iad4.amazon.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA; 14 Feb 2018 13:44:54 +0000 Received: from uc8d3ff76b9bc5848a9cc.ant.amazon.com (iad1-ws-svc-lb91-vlan3.amazon.com [10.0.103.150]) by email-inbound-relay-1d-2c665b5d.us-east-1.amazon.com (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id w1EDihCN003780 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 14 Feb 2018 13:44:46 GMT Received: from uc8d3ff76b9bc5848a9cc.ant.amazon.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by uc8d3ff76b9bc5848a9cc.ant.amazon.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Debian-3) with ESMTP id w1EDigj3014277; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 13:44:42 GMT Received: (from dwmw@localhost) by uc8d3ff76b9bc5848a9cc.ant.amazon.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id w1EDigFN014273; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 13:44:42 GMT From: David Woodhouse To: tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org, jmattson@google.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Revert "x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()" Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 13:44:33 +0000 Message-Id: <1518615874-13806-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1518615874-13806-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> References: <1518615874-13806-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This reverts commit 1dde7415e99933bb7293d6b2843752cbdb43ec11. By putting the RSB filling out of line and calling it, we waste one RSB slot for returning from the function itself, which means one fewer actual function call we can make if we're doing the Skylake abomination of call-depth counting. It also changed the number of RSB stuffings we do on vmexit from 32, which was correct, to 16. Let's just stop with the bikeshedding; it didn't actually *fix* anything anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 3 -- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 - arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 56 ---------------------------- 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 2a35b1e..60c4c34 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -252,8 +252,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - /* Clobbers %ebx */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 1c5420420..1d83563 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -364,8 +364,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - /* Clobbers %rbx */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h index 4d11161..1908214 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -38,7 +38,4 @@ INDIRECT_THUNK(dx) INDIRECT_THUNK(si) INDIRECT_THUNK(di) INDIRECT_THUNK(bp) -asmlinkage void __fill_rsb(void); -asmlinkage void __clear_rsb(void); - #endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 34cbce3..94749fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -8,6 +8,50 @@ #include #include +/* + * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. + * + * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an + * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. + * + * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based + * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to + * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes + * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would + * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. + * + * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and + * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that + * from C via asm(".include ") but let's not go there. + */ + +#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ +#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ + +/* + * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be + * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation + * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. + */ +#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \ + mov $(nr/2), reg; \ +771: \ + call 772f; \ +773: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + lfence; \ + jmp 773b; \ +772: \ + call 774f; \ +775: /* speculation trap */ \ + pause; \ + lfence; \ + jmp 775b; \ +774: \ + dec reg; \ + jnz 771b; \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; + #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -78,10 +122,17 @@ #endif .endm -/* This clobbers the BX register */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER nr:req ftr:req + /* + * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP + * monstrosity above, manually. + */ +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "", "call __clear_rsb", \ftr + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ + \ftr +.Lskip_rsb_\@: #endif .endm @@ -163,10 +214,15 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - alternative_input("", - "call __fill_rsb", - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, - ASM_NO_INPUT_CLOBBER(_ASM_BX, "memory")); + unsigned long loops; + + asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE + ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", + __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + "910:" + : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + : : "memory" ); #endif } diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index 69a4739..f23934b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o -OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_retpoline.o :=y obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 480edc3..c909961 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include .macro THUNK reg .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -47,58 +46,3 @@ GENERATE_THUNK(r13) GENERATE_THUNK(r14) GENERATE_THUNK(r15) #endif - -/* - * Fill the CPU return stack buffer. - * - * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an - * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution. - * - * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based - * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to - * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes - * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would - * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used. - * - * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be - * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation - * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop. - */ -.macro STUFF_RSB nr:req sp:req - mov $(\nr / 2), %_ASM_BX - .align 16 -771: - call 772f -773: /* speculation trap */ - pause - lfence - jmp 773b - .align 16 -772: - call 774f -775: /* speculation trap */ - pause - lfence - jmp 775b - .align 16 -774: - dec %_ASM_BX - jnz 771b - add $((BITS_PER_LONG/8) * \nr), \sp -.endm - -#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */ - -ENTRY(__fill_rsb) - STUFF_RSB RSB_FILL_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP - ret -END(__fill_rsb) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fill_rsb) - -#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */ - -ENTRY(__clear_rsb) - STUFF_RSB RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %_ASM_SP - ret -END(__clear_rsb) -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__clear_rsb) -- 2.7.4