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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d90-v6si437119pld.193.2018.02.15.11.52.41; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 11:52:56 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1162028AbeBOPVT (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 15 Feb 2018 10:21:19 -0500 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:48542 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1161999AbeBOPVM (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Feb 2018 10:21:12 -0500 Received: from localhost (LFbn-1-12258-90.w90-92.abo.wanadoo.fr [90.92.71.90]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 17BC51110; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 15:21:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers , Shuah Khan Subject: [PATCH 4.4 019/108] usbip: fix 3eee23c3ec14 tcp_socket address still in the status file Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 16:16:16 +0100 Message-Id: <20180215151225.239469900@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.1 In-Reply-To: <20180215151222.267507937@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180215151222.267507937@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Shuah Khan Commit 3eee23c3ec14 ("usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address") backported the following commit from mailine. However, backport error caused the tcp_socket address to still leak. commit 2f2d0088eb93 ("usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address") When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is locally leaking a socket pointer address via the /sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug output when "usbip --debug port" is run. Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}. As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with sockfd. Reported-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device * a security hole, the change is made to use sockfd instead. */ out += sprintf(out, - "prt sta spd bus dev sockfd local_busid\n"); + "prt sta spd dev sockfd local_busid\n"); for (i = 0; i < VHCI_NPORTS; i++) { struct vhci_device *vdev = port_to_vdev(i); @@ -64,12 +64,11 @@ static ssize_t status_show(struct device if (vdev->ud.status == VDEV_ST_USED) { out += sprintf(out, "%03u %08x ", vdev->speed, vdev->devid); - out += sprintf(out, "%16p ", vdev->ud.tcp_socket); - out += sprintf(out, "%06u", vdev->ud.sockfd); + out += sprintf(out, "%06u ", vdev->ud.sockfd); out += sprintf(out, "%s", dev_name(&vdev->udev->dev)); } else - out += sprintf(out, "000 000 000 000000 0-0"); + out += sprintf(out, "000 00000000 000000 0-0"); out += sprintf(out, "\n"); spin_unlock(&vdev->ud.lock);