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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id o10si2437994pgn.116.2018.02.16.00.29.50; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 00:30:05 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1426067AbeBOQfP (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 15 Feb 2018 11:35:15 -0500 Received: from smtp2.provo.novell.com ([137.65.250.81]:49722 "EHLO smtp2.provo.novell.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1426030AbeBOQef (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Feb 2018 11:34:35 -0500 Received: from linux-n805.suse.de (prv-ext-foundry1int.gns.novell.com [137.65.251.240]) by smtp2.provo.novell.com with ESMTP (TLS encrypted); Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:34:30 -0700 From: Davidlohr Bueso To: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mhocko@kernel.org, mtk.manpages@gmail.com, robert.kettler@outlook.com, manfred@colorfullife.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dave@stgolabs.net, Davidlohr Bueso Subject: [PATCH 2/3] ipc/sem: introduce semctl(SEM_STAT_ANY) Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:24:57 -0800 Message-Id: <20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20180215162458.10059-1-dave@stgolabs.net> References: <20180215162458.10059-1-dave@stgolabs.net> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed anyways in the procfs files. While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some reported cases for shm. This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition, I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the procfs file. Reported-by: Robert Kettler Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso --- include/uapi/linux/sem.h | 1 + ipc/sem.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sem.h b/include/uapi/linux/sem.h index 9c3e745b0656..39a1876f039e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/sem.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sem.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ /* ipcs ctl cmds */ #define SEM_STAT 18 #define SEM_INFO 19 +#define SEM_STAT_ANY 20 /* Obsolete, used only for backwards compatibility and libc5 compiles */ struct semid_ds { diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c index a4af04979fd2..79acad0e0aa1 100644 --- a/ipc/sem.c +++ b/ipc/sem.c @@ -1190,14 +1190,14 @@ static int semctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid, memset(semid64, 0, sizeof(*semid64)); rcu_read_lock(); - if (cmd == SEM_STAT) { + if (cmd == SEM_STAT || cmd == SEM_STAT_ANY) { sma = sem_obtain_object(ns, semid); if (IS_ERR(sma)) { err = PTR_ERR(sma); goto out_unlock; } id = sma->sem_perm.id; - } else { + } else { /* IPC_STAT */ sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid); if (IS_ERR(sma)) { err = PTR_ERR(sma); @@ -1205,9 +1205,14 @@ static int semctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid, } } - err = -EACCES; - if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, S_IRUGO)) - goto out_unlock; + /* see comment for SHM_STAT_ANY */ + if (cmd == SEM_STAT_ANY) + audit_ipc_obj(&sma->sem_perm); + else { + err = -EACCES; + if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, S_IRUGO)) + goto out_unlock; + } err = security_sem_semctl(sma, cmd); if (err) @@ -1596,6 +1601,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semctl, int, semid, int, semnum, int, cmd, unsigned long, arg) return semctl_info(ns, semid, cmd, p); case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: + case SEM_STAT_ANY: err = semctl_stat(ns, semid, cmd, &semid64); if (err < 0) return err; @@ -1697,6 +1703,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semctl, int, semid, int, semnum, int, cmd, int, arg) return semctl_info(ns, semid, cmd, p); case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: + case SEM_STAT_ANY: err = semctl_stat(ns, semid, cmd, &semid64); if (err < 0) return err; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 373dceede50d..38f71d12206a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5847,6 +5847,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) break; case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: + case SEM_STAT_ANY: perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; break; default: diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 51d22b03b0ae..d478c0940b00 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3167,6 +3167,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) case GETALL: case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: + case SEM_STAT_ANY: may = MAY_READ; break; case SETVAL: -- 2.13.6