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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 074/195] [Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
Date:   Thu, 15 Feb 2018 16:16:05 +0100
Message-Id: <20180215151709.395680184@linuxfoundation.org>
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References: <20180215151705.738773577@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>


Commit 30d88c0e3ace upstream.

It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel
address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction
abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here,
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening
in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling
an IRQ from EL0.

Reported-by: Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S |    5 +++++
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c     |    6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -821,6 +821,11 @@ el0_irq_naked:
 #endif
 
 	ct_user_exit
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	tbz	x22, #55, 1f
+	bl	do_el0_irq_bp_hardening
+1:
+#endif
 	irq_handler
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -751,6 +751,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort
 	arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr);
 }
 
+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+	/* PC has already been checked in entry.S */
+	arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
+}
+
 asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,
 						   unsigned int esr,
 						   struct pt_regs *regs)