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Date:   Fri, 16 Feb 2018 09:58:00 +0100
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To:     David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 11/10] x86/retpoline: Avoid return buffer underflows
 on context switch
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On Tue 2018-01-09 13:04:20, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-01-08 at 19:27 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >?
> > > If SMEP is not active, speculation can go anywhere, including to a user
> > > controlled gadget which can reload any registers it needs, including
> > > with immediate constants.
> > 
> > I thought that, even on pre-SMEP hardware, the CPU wouldn't
> > speculatively execute from NX pages.? And PTI marks user memory NX
> > in kernel mode.
> 
> Hm, now that could be useful.?
> 
> Do *all* the KPTI backports (some of which are reimplementations rather
> than strictly backports) mark user memory NX?

Hmm. We'd still want to do something on 32-bit, and those might not
even have NX support in hardware.

Pentium 4 (and such) is probably advanced enough to be vulnerable to
spectre, but not new enough to support NX...

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
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