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From:   Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 16 Feb 2018 19:51:27 +0000
Message-ID: <CACdnJutpJa3nnH0Cs=x-=+GYp+9R5ZJkREhd7DvwDcmyjufSHA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc:     pjones@redhat.com, joe.konno@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de,
        mingo@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        jk@ozlabs.org, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
        benjamin.drung@profitbricks.com
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On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 11:31 AM Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
wrote:
> This is why I was leaning towards applying these patches: not breaking
> userland is an important rule, but it does not imply every aspect of
> behavior observable by userland is set in stone. In other words, I
> agree with Peter that making this change does not *break* userland in
> a way anyone is likely to care deeply about.

In some modes tpmtotp will run as non-root and expect to be able to read an
EFI variable.