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Biederman) To: Dongsu Park Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, Alban Crequy , Miklos Szeredi , Seth Forshee , Sargun Dhillon , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Serge Hallyn References: Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 17:16:59 -0600 In-Reply-To: (Dongsu Park's message of "Fri, 22 Dec 2017 15:32:33 +0100") Message-ID: <87d110lgd0.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1enugW-0005c8-Dm;;;mid=<87d110lgd0.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=174.19.85.160;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+L2xJyiCvahVAxZ+yJz8e0OoMMokcsfjI= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 174.19.85.160 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.1 (2015-04-28) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.0 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,TVD_RCVD_IP,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_TooManySym_01, T_TooManySym_02,XMNoVowels,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.1 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **;Dongsu Park X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 15037 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.05 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.3 (0.0%), b_tie_ro: 2.3 (0.0%), parse: 1.23 (0.0%), extract_message_metadata: 21 (0.1%), get_uri_detail_list: 2.8 (0.0%), tests_pri_-1000: 3.5 (0.0%), tests_pri_-950: 1.40 (0.0%), tests_pri_-900: 1.03 (0.0%), tests_pri_-400: 23 (0.2%), check_bayes: 22 (0.1%), b_tokenize: 8 (0.1%), b_tok_get_all: 7 (0.0%), b_comp_prob: 2.1 (0.0%), b_tok_touch_all: 3.0 (0.0%), b_finish: 0.66 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 183 (1.2%), check_dkim_signature: 0.56 (0.0%), check_dkim_adsp: 3.2 (0.0%), tests_pri_500: 14796 (98.4%), poll_dns_idle: 14782 (98.3%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/11] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Dongsu Park writes: > From: Seth Forshee > > Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the > allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed > for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such > cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns > to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user > the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable > to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same > userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also > export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a > module. > > Patch v4 is available: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8944671/ > > Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" > Cc: Serge Hallyn > Cc: Miklos Szeredi > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee > Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" > --- > fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +- > kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + > 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c > index ad1cfac1..d41559a0 100644 > --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c > +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c > @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc) > const struct cred *cred; > > if (fc->allow_other) > - return 1; > + return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns); > > cred = current_cred(); > if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) && > diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c > index 246d4d4c..492c255e 100644 > --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c > +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c > @@ -1235,6 +1235,7 @@ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns) > { > return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns()); > } > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns); > > static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns) > {