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Date:   Thu, 22 Feb 2018 20:08:14 +0100
From:   Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
To:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:     linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
        linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        jforbes@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is
 locked down
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On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 02:20:43PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> commit 87a39b258eca2e15884ee90c3fcd5758d6057b17
> Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Date:   Thu Feb 22 13:42:04 2018 +0000
> 
>     kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
>     
>     This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown.  A locked down
>     kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images to be loaded with

s/to be loaded/from being loaded/
(my own mistake :-))

Otherwise looks good. Thanks for improving my idea.

Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>

-- 
Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
SUSE Labs, Prague, Czechia