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Biederman" To: Miklos Szeredi Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Alban Crequy , Seth Forshee , Sargun Dhillon , Dongsu Park , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 17:53:02 -0600 Message-Id: <20180226235302.12708-7-ebiederm@xmission.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <87po4rz4ui.fsf_-_@xmission.com> References: <87po4rz4ui.fsf_-_@xmission.com> X-XM-SPF: eid=1eqSbX-0005iL-6J;;;mid=<20180226235302.12708-7-ebiederm@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=174.19.85.160;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+4XdcgdpsTmUpOSYfGIdO/snK4c62aWS8= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 174.19.85.160 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.1 (2015-04-28) on sa08.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,TVD_RCVD_IP,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_TooManySym_01, T_TooManySym_02,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.1 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5015] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa08 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=56] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa08 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=56 X-Spam-Combo: ;Miklos Szeredi X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 318 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.04 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 4.1 (1.3%), b_tie_ro: 3.0 (1.0%), parse: 0.81 (0.3%), extract_message_metadata: 17 (5.3%), get_uri_detail_list: 2.0 (0.6%), tests_pri_-1000: 9 (3.0%), tests_pri_-950: 1.12 (0.4%), tests_pri_-900: 0.90 (0.3%), tests_pri_-400: 21 (6.5%), check_bayes: 19 (6.1%), b_tokenize: 5 (1.7%), b_tok_get_all: 7 (2.3%), b_comp_prob: 1.26 (0.4%), b_tok_touch_all: 3.6 (1.1%), b_finish: 0.76 (0.2%), tests_pri_0: 139 (43.8%), check_dkim_signature: 0.37 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 3.2 (1.0%), tests_pri_500: 122 (38.3%), poll_dns_idle: 116 (36.6%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH v7 7/7] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Seth Forshee Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a module. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Miklos Szeredi Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 79cca1687457..0cbd1ff3dd48 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc) const struct cred *cred; if (fc->allow_other) - return 1; + return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns); cred = current_cred(); if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) && diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 246d4d4ce5c7..492c255e6c5a 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -1235,6 +1235,7 @@ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns) { return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns()); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns); static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns) { -- 2.14.1