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From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 27 Feb 2018 17:36:34 +0000
Message-ID: <CALCETrVo61UOGHJ6AgrLN_AyzUYuz-JRgET4d6ut-ErwUg_vZA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
 programs per process hierarchy
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
        =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@digikod.net>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
        Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:30 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 2/27/2018 8:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
>> <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> [ Snip ]
>> An earlier version of the patch set used the seccomp filter chain.
>> Mickaël, what exactly was wrong with that approach other than that the
>> seccomp() syscall was awkward for you to use?  You could add a
>> seccomp_add_landlock_rule() syscall if you needed to.
>>
>> As a side comment, why is this an LSM at all, let alone a non-stacking
>> LSM?  It would make a lot more sense to me to make Landlock depend on
>> having LSMs configured in but to call the landlock hooks directly from
>> the security_xyz() hooks.
>
> Please, no. It is my serious intention to have at least the
> infrastructure blob management in within a release or two, and
> I think that's all Landlock needs. The security_xyz() hooks are
> sufficiently hackish as it is without unnecessarily adding more
> special cases.
>
>

What do you mean by "infrastructure blob management"?