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From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 28 Feb 2018 00:09:13 +0000
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Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
To:     =?UTF-8?B?TWlja2HDq2wgU2FsYcO8bg==?= <mic@digikod.net>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
        Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
        Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
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On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>
> On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>> I think you're wrong here.  Any sane container trying to use Landlock
>>> like this would also create a PID namespace.  Problem solved.  I still
>>> think you should drop this patch.
>
> Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web
> browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail,
> Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a
> developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications
> (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls
> (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to
> create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful
> access-control.
>

The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp.
If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web
browser, I can debug the browser.

If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace
protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp
feature.