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Y. Srinivasan" , "Michael Kelley \(EOSG\)" , Andrey Smetanin , "Denis V . Lunev" Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: inject #GP only when invalid SINTx vector is unmasked References: <20180228134401.6544-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> <20180228134401.6544-4-vkuznets@redhat.com> <20180228151843.GB2376@rkaganb.sw.ru> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 16:35:59 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20180228151843.GB2376@rkaganb.sw.ru> (Roman Kagan's message of "Wed, 28 Feb 2018 18:18:44 +0300") Message-ID: <87lgfdgm8w.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.3 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.4 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.1]); Wed, 28 Feb 2018 15:36:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.1]); Wed, 28 Feb 2018 15:36:03 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.4' DOMAIN:'int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'vkuznets@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Roman Kagan writes: > On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 02:44:01PM +0100, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: >> Hyper-V 2016 on KVM with SynIC enabled doesn't boot with the following >> trace: >> >> kvm_entry: vcpu 0 >> kvm_exit: reason MSR_WRITE rip 0xfffff8000131c1e5 info 0 0 >> kvm_hv_synic_set_msr: vcpu_id 0 msr 0x40000090 data 0x10000 host 0 >> kvm_msr: msr_write 40000090 = 0x10000 (#GP) >> kvm_inj_exception: #GP (0x0) > > I don't remember having seen this... Does this happen with the mainline > QEMU, which doesn't set the SintPollingModeAvailable (17) bit in cpuid > 0x40000003:edx? Yes, you need to have Hyper-V role enabled, kvm-intel modules needs to be loaded with 'nesting' support enabled. > >> >> KVM acts according to the following statement from TLFS: >> >> " >> 11.8.4 SINTx Registers >> ... >> Valid values for vector are 16-255 inclusive. Specifying an invalid >> vector number results in #GP. >> " >> >> However, I checked and genuine Hyper-V doesn't #GP when we write 0x10000 >> to SINTx. I checked with Microsoft and they confirmed that if either the >> Masked bit (bit 16) or the Polling bit (bit 18) is set to 1, then they >> ignore the value of Vector. Make KVM act accordingly. > > I wonder if that cpuid setting affects this behavior? Also curious what > exactly the guest is trying to achieve writing this bogus value? The value is actually the default value which is supposed to be there: "At virtual processor creation time, the default value of all SINTx (synthetic interrupt source) registers is 0x0000000000010000." so I guess this is just an intialization procedure. > >> >> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov >> --- >> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/hyperv.h | 1 + >> arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 7 ++++++- >> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/hyperv.h >> index 62c778a303a1..a492dc357bd7 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/hyperv.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/hyperv.h >> @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ typedef struct _HV_REFERENCE_TSC_PAGE { >> #define HV_SYNIC_SIEFP_ENABLE (1ULL << 0) >> #define HV_SYNIC_SINT_MASKED (1ULL << 16) >> #define HV_SYNIC_SINT_AUTO_EOI (1ULL << 17) >> +#define HV_SYNIC_SINT_POLLING (1ULL << 18) >> #define HV_SYNIC_SINT_VECTOR_MASK (0xFF) >> >> #define HV_SYNIC_STIMER_COUNT (4) >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c >> index 6d14f808145d..d3d866c32976 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c >> @@ -95,9 +95,14 @@ static int synic_set_sint(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, int sint, >> u64 data, bool host) >> { >> int vector, old_vector; >> + bool masked, polling; >> >> vector = data & HV_SYNIC_SINT_VECTOR_MASK; >> - if (vector < HV_SYNIC_FIRST_VALID_VECTOR && !host) >> + masked = data & HV_SYNIC_SINT_MASKED; >> + polling = data & HV_SYNIC_SINT_POLLING; >> + >> + if (vector < HV_SYNIC_FIRST_VALID_VECTOR && >> + !host && !masked && !polling) >> return 1; >> /* >> * Guest may configure multiple SINTs to use the same vector, so > > I'm not sure this is enough to implement the polling mode: per spec, > Oh, no, I wasn't trying to -- and by the way we don't currently announce SintPollingModeAvailable so guests are not supposed to do that. This is rather a future proof to 'not forget'. >> Setting the polling bit will have the effect of unmasking an interrupt >> source, except that an actual interrupt is not generated. > > However, if the guest sets a valid vector and the masked bit cleared, > we'll consider it a usual SINT and add to masks and inject interrupts, > etc, regardless of the polling bit. > > I must admit I'm confused by the above quote from the spec: is the > polling bit supposed to come together with the masked bit? If so, then > we probably should validate it here (but your logs indicate otherwise). > In general I'm missing the utility of this mode: why should an interrupt > controller be involved in polling at all? "Setting the polling bit will have the effect of unmasking an interrupt source, except that an actual interrupt is not generated." So, as I understand it, setting polling bit makes Vector value irrelevant - the interrupt is not generated so I *assume* we may see writes with zero Vector and polling bit set. But again, we're not implementing polling mode for now, I can just drop it from the patch if you think it is confusing. -- Vitaly