Received: by 10.213.65.68 with SMTP id h4csp492171imn; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 09:22:18 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELv2wp7BzYVqqUyt0xaZUrb6paWPLXMa0zIPzNrRTPzjDo3NffLrcs+mMIu18M+CkH4peota X-Received: by 10.98.185.11 with SMTP id z11mr2038089pfe.153.1521217338913; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 09:22:18 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1521217338; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=r2hs7DhcfFD9Q7vgOWqW8sr6NVetPzQKGCUuTLnwAsfFjz+ZGlJkF9bfKzEUrUiVm3 Xkk7tl/PBZMK1wyIjxIU1lw10dDctFNgZVrs44JPOJRU+9UjmRsg/amHRCsgNyJ1g6Oy spNKgcBANUpgNuopbVAZxEjmNoOe9rSX0X+w2gtJwtpExNyV1/SyL4Zh7wrX7QwcehG6 4L/1+XXNBIIk7kSbdXhdjlS8buCymA5YqZXDLLbH7kF+bQTRCZ3k8u4IBT0OlCeeIj7m Q/Eu6rDJbcQFWf6ONsbIzIn6ZQYkoB0MWH4G+PNzsCyxKvhiwyW0yylBqptc9YFapkp0 KBEw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:message-id:content-language :content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to:mime-version:user-agent:date :from:references:cc:to:subject:arc-authentication-results; bh=Qy9uTn8/+R/IE34tKOi6f9fepWnaSFgMI1dGh+aOwTQ=; b=Qu3I5OgrccH+162HmgkS8rhjLWNkNWuesDaWA54hHKteJd3Emh/9DypIAZndizszPO uEjl/N3hwmEOZQnCoWCtmubIVw+DuDw4Fsv1rxtHL7+5xl78jcEa/SwDKd4bOVRZQjNj pZIIzUWXw6Q8JinhRCHVp5VtbGLYSV4RdgsMflV41qxrdINqtNQ3Vaq+X5i9OAP/6CAg M/u1FPD/6tPaxXXWiXmTyTLGSNNp3gTXmpg8gcfz5uo41Kjs5AzSv//8YO8Ezlrb+FAW eA7auMCINtyGxuxJ5u3EbDnMZxZldzH8q8otMgWQXrN1k/Jfuo99M6ns9CTDp+SiyVht x0bg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 64-v6si6437041ply.528.2018.03.16.09.22.03; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 09:22:18 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752430AbeCPQT4 (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 16 Mar 2018 12:19:56 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:34684 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750982AbeCPQTx (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Mar 2018 12:19:53 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098416.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GGGA92050786 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 12:19:53 -0400 Received: from e36.co.us.ibm.com (e36.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.154]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grh8a899j-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 12:19:52 -0400 Received: from localhost by e36.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 10:09:45 -0600 Received: from b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (9.17.130.18) by e36.co.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.136) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 10:09:43 -0600 Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.234]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GG9fvT11534760; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 09:09:42 -0700 Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id E1AD56A03D; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 10:09:41 -0600 (MDT) Received: from oc8043147753.ibm.com (unknown [9.60.75.215]) by b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5D1D6A03B; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 10:09:39 -0600 (MDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 04/14] KVM: s390: device attribute to set AP interpretive execution To: Pierre Morel , Halil Pasic , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: freude@de.ibm.com, schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, kwankhede@nvidia.com, bjsdjshi@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, alex.williamson@redhat.com, alifm@linux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jjherne@linux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, fiuczy@linux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@de.ibm.com References: <1521051954-25715-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1521051954-25715-5-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <21bd029b-3500-3461-ce98-68ad3ae9b647@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <46a7e838-2be2-9587-6eb2-3bba95485609@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <5ed8017b-0168-9a50-234b-cfe9258eab72@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <17683324-f6e4-4328-54c1-1fce572faecd@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <8e10f1cb-3722-d231-2603-b7867420ac0a@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <5dd1bcd3-5d17-37c1-1184-7f75a1fd32bc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <68e9e3ea-f99a-da88-5e56-21e38b438b4f@linux.vnet.ibm.com> From: Tony Krowiak Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 12:09:39 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <68e9e3ea-f99a-da88-5e56-21e38b438b4f@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031616-0020-0000-0000-00000D99A67C X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008685; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01003939; UDB=6.00510966; IPR=6.00783227; MB=3.00020075; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 16:09:45 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031616-0021-0000-0000-000060851CBA Message-Id: X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2018-03-16_09:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160199 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 03/16/2018 03:51 AM, Pierre Morel wrote: > On 16/03/2018 00:39, Tony Krowiak wrote: >> On 03/15/2018 01:56 PM, Pierre Morel wrote: >>> On 15/03/2018 18:21, Tony Krowiak wrote: >>>> On 03/15/2018 11:45 AM, Pierre Morel wrote: >>>>> On 15/03/2018 16:26, Tony Krowiak wrote: >>>>>> On 03/15/2018 09:00 AM, Pierre Morel wrote: >>>>>>> On 14/03/2018 22:57, Halil Pasic wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 03/14/2018 07:25 PM, Tony Krowiak wrote: >>>>>>>>> The VFIO AP device model exploits interpretive execution of AP >>>>>>>>> instructions (APIE) to provide guests passthrough access to AP >>>>>>>>> devices. This patch introduces a new device attribute in the >>>>>>>>> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO device attribute group to set APIE from >>>>>>>>> the VFIO AP device defined on the guest. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak >>>>>>>>> --- >>>>>>>> [..] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >>>>>>>>> index a60c45b..bc46b67 100644 >>>>>>>>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >>>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c >>>>>>>>> @@ -815,6 +815,19 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct >>>>>>>>> kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr) >>>>>>>>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask)); >>>>>>>>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "DISABLE: DEA keywrapping >>>>>>>>> support"); >>>>>>>>> break; >>>>>>>>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_INTERPRET_AP: >>>>>>>>> + if (attr->addr) { >>>>>>>>> + if (!test_kvm_cpu_feat(kvm, >>>>>>>>> KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP)) >>>>>>>> Unlock mutex before returning? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Maybe flip conditions (don't allow manipulating apie if feature >>>>>>>> not there). >>>>>>>> Clearing the anyways clear apie if feature not there ain't too >>>>>>>> bad, but >>>>>>>> rejecting the operation appears nicer to me. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP; >>>>>>>>> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 1; >>>>>>>>> + VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", >>>>>>>>> + "ENABLE: AP interpretive execution"); >>>>>>>>> + } else { >>>>>>>>> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 0; >>>>>>>>> + VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", >>>>>>>>> + "DISABLE: AP interpretive execution"); >>>>>>>>> + } >>>>>>>>> + break; >>>>>>>>> default: >>>>>>>>> mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); >>>>>>>>> return -ENXIO; >>>>>>>> I wonder how the loop after this switch works for >>>>>>>> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_INTERPRET_AP: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { >>>>>>>> kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup(vcpu); >>>>>>>> exit_sie(vcpu); >>>>>>>> } >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> From not doing something like for KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_INTERPRET_AP >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> if (kvm->created_vcpus) { >>>>>>>> mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); >>>>>>>> return -EBUSY; >>>>>>>> and from the aforementioned loop I guess ECA.28 can be changed >>>>>>>> for a running guest. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If there are running vcpus when KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_INTERPRET_AP is >>>>>>>> changed (set) these will be taken out of SIE by exit_sie(). >>>>>>>> Then for the >>>>>>>> corresponding threads the control probably goes to QEMU (the >>>>>>>> emulator in >>>>>>>> the userspace). And it puts that vcpu back into the SIE, and >>>>>>>> then that >>>>>>>> cpu starts acting according to the new ECA.28 value. While >>>>>>>> other vcpus >>>>>>>> may still work with the old value of ECA.28. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm not saying what I describe above is necessarily something >>>>>>>> broken. >>>>>>>> But I would like to have it explained, why is it OK -- provided >>>>>>>> I did not >>>>>>>> make any errors in my reasoning (assumptions included). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Can you help me understand this code? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>> Halil >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [..] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have the same concerns as Halil. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We do not need to change the virtulization type >>>>>>> (hardware/software) on the fly for the current use case. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Couldn't we delay this until we have one and in between only >>>>>>> make the vCPU hotplug clean? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We only need to let the door open for the day we have such a use >>>>>>> case. >>>>>> Are you suggesting this code be removed? If so, then where and >>>>>> under what conditions would >>>>>> you suggest setting ECA.28 given you objected to setting it based >>>>>> on whether the >>>>>> AP feature is installed? >>>>> >>>>> I would only call kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup() from inside >>>>> kvm_arch_vcpu_init() >>>>> as it is already. >>>> It is not called from kvm_arch_vcpu_init(), it is called from >>>> kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(). >>> >>> hum, sorry for this. >>> However, the idea pertains, not to call this function from inside an >>> ioctl changing crypto parameters, but only during vcpu creation. >> Unfortunately, the ioctl does not get called until after the vcpus >> are created (see my comments below) > > That is why I think you should not change the ECA field from the > crypto ioctl but only during the vcpu initialization phase. By what means do you suggest we do that? > > >>> >>> >>> >>>> Also, >>>> this loop was already here, I did not put it in. Assuming whomever >>>> put it there did so >>>> for a reason, it is not my place to remove it. According to a trace >>>> I ran, the calls to this >>>> function occur after the vcpus are created. Consequently, the >>>> kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup() >>>> function would not be called without the loop and neither the key >>>> wrapping support nor the >>>> ECA_APIE would be configured in the vcpu's SIE descriptor. >>>> >>>> If you have a better idea for where/how to set this flag, I'm all >>>> ears. It would be nice if it could be set before the vcpus are >>>> created, but I haven't >>>> found a good candidate. I suspect that the loop was put in to make >>>> sure that all vcpus >>>> get updated regardless of whether they are running or not, but I >>>> don't know what happens >>>> after a vcpu is kicked out of SIE. I suspect, as Halil surmised, >>>> that QEMU >>>> restores the vcpus to SIE. This would seemingly cause the >>>> kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() to get >>>> called at which time the ECA_APIE value as well as the key wrapping >>>> values will get set. >>>> If somebody has knowledge of the flow here, please feel free to >>>> pitch in. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Pierre >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >