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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org,
        syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
        Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>,
        Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 58/86] netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: dont trust userland offsets
Date:   Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:23:21 +0100
Message-Id: <20180316152321.326160653@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20180316152317.167709497@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

commit b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6 upstream.

We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.

The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.

Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.

Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -2031,7 +2031,9 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_eb
 		if (match_kern)
 			match_kern->match_size = ret;
 
-		WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left);
+		if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
 	}
 
@@ -2087,6 +2089,15 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_ent
 	 *
 	 * offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0).
 	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) {
+		if (offsets[i] >= *total)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (i == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i])
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
 		struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
 		unsigned int size;