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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id u21si9930303pfl.143.2018.04.01.15.07.31; Sun, 01 Apr 2018 15:07:45 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753971AbeDAWG0 (ORCPT + 99 others); Sun, 1 Apr 2018 18:06:26 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh2.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.6]:50572 "EHLO smtp-sh2.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753915AbeDAWGW (ORCPT ); Sun, 1 Apr 2018 18:06:22 -0400 Received: from smtp8.infomaniak.ch (smtp8.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.38]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id w31M5AGL019318 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 2 Apr 2018 00:05:10 +0200 Received: from ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp8.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id w31M4l06037139 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Mon, 2 Apr 2018 00:05:04 +0200 From: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Tycho Andersen , LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Michael Kerrisk , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Tejun Heo , Thomas Graf , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development References: <20180227004121.3633-1-mic@digikod.net> <2e06621c-08e9-dc12-9b6e-9c09d5d8f458@digikod.net> <20180306224636.wf5z3kujtc7r5qyh@cisco> <7082be04-d6af-b853-4bb7-f331836662e2@digikod.net> Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=mic@digikod.net; keydata= xsFNBFNUOTgBEAC5HCwtCH/iikbZRDkXUSZa078Fz8H/21oNdzi13NM0ZdeR9KVq28ZCBAud law2P+HhaPFuZLqzRiy+iNOumPgrUyNphLhxWby/JgD7hvhYs5HJgdX0VTwzGqprmAeDKbnS G0Q2zxmnkb1/ENRTfrOIBm5LwyRhWIw5hg+HKh88g6qztDHdVSGqgWGLhj7RqDgHCgC4kAve /tWwfnpmMMndi5V+wg5EanyiffjAq6GHwzWbal+u3lkV8zNo15VZ+6mOY3X6dfYFVeX8hAP4 u6OxzK4dQhDMVnJux5jum8RXtkSASiQpvx80npFbToIMgziWoWPV+Ag3Ti9JsactNzygozjL G0j8nc4dtfdkFoflEqtFIz2ZVWlmvcjbxTbvFpK2TwbVSiXe3Iyn4FIatk8tPsyY+mwKLzsc RNXaOXXB3kza0JmmnOyLCZuCTkds8FHvEG3nMIvyzXiobFM5F2b5Xo5x0fSo2ycIXXWgNJFn X1QXiPEM+emIRH0q2mHNAdvDki/Ns+qmkI4MQjWNGLGzlzb2GJBb5jXmkxEhk0/hUXVK3WYu 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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Tycho Andersen , LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Michael Kerrisk , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Tejun Heo , Thomas Graf , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development Message-ID: <0f355079-7ee2-c06a-2d47-a7a2fa6d98fe@digikod.net> Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing References: <20180227004121.3633-1-mic@digikod.net> <2e06621c-08e9-dc12-9b6e-9c09d5d8f458@digikod.net> <20180306224636.wf5z3kujtc7r5qyh@cisco> <7082be04-d6af-b853-4bb7-f331836662e2@digikod.net> In-Reply-To: --F0X3aGkiRSyJCWu2SB4Vbzc5KAEyYJSt8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 03/09/2018 12:53 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 11:51 PM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: >> >> On 07/03/2018 02:21, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> On Tue, Mar 6, 2018 at 11:06 PM, Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn wrote: >>>> >>>> On 06/03/2018 23:46, Tycho Andersen wrote: >>>>> On Tue, Mar 06, 2018 at 10:33:17PM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>>>> Suppose I'm writing a container manager. I want to run "mount" = in the >>>>>>>> container, but I don't want to allow moun() in general and I wan= t to >>>>>>>> emulate certain mount() actions. I can write a filter that catc= hes >>>>>>>> mount using seccomp and calls out to the container manager for h= elp. >>>>>>>> This isn't theoretical -- Tycho wants *exactly* this use case to= be >>>>>>>> supported. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, I think this use case should be handled with something like= >>>>>>> LD_PRELOAD and a helper library. FYI, I did something like this: >>>>>>> https://github.com/stemjail/stemshim >>>>>> >>>>>> I doubt that will work for containers. Containers that use user >>>>>> namespaces and, for example, setuid programs aren't going to honor= >>>>>> LD_PRELOAD. >>>>> >>>>> Or anything that calls syscalls directly, like go programs. >>>> >>>> That's why the vDSO-like approach. Enforcing an access control is no= t >>>> the issue here, patching a buggy userland (without patching its code= ) is >>>> the issue isn't it? >>>> >>>> As far as I remember, the main problem is to handle file descriptors= >>>> while "emulating" the kernel behavior. This can be done with a "shim= " >>>> code mapped in every processes. Chrome used something like this (in = a >>>> previous sandbox mechanism) as a kind of emulation (with the current= >>>> seccomp-bpf ). I think it should be doable to replace the (userland)= >>>> emulation code with an IPC wrapper receiving file descriptors throug= h >>>> UNIX socket. >>>> >>> >>> Can you explain exactly what you mean by "vDSO-like"? >>> >>> When a 64-bit program does a syscall, it just executes the SYSCALL >>> instruction. The vDSO isn't involved at all. 32-bit programs usuall= y >>> go through the vDSO, but not always. >>> >>> It could be possible to force-load a DSO into an entire container and= >>> rig up seccomp to intercept all SYSCALLs not originating from the DSO= >>> such that they merely redirect control to the DSO, but that seems >>> quite messy. >> >> vDSO is a code mapped for all processes. As you said, these processes >> may use it or not. What I was thinking about is to use the same concep= t, >> i.e. map a "shim" code into each processes pertaining to a particular >> hierarchy (the same way seccomp filters are inherited across processes= ). >> With a seccomp filter matching some syscall (e.g. mount, open), it is >> possible to jump back to the shim code thanks to SECCOMP_RET_TRAP. Thi= s >> shim code should then be able to emulate/patch what is needed, even >> faking a file opening by receiving a file descriptor through a UNIX >> socket. As did the Chrome sandbox, the seccomp filter may look at the >> calling address to allow the shim code to call syscalls without being >> catched, if needed. However, relying on SIGSYS may not fit with >> arbitrary code. Using a new SECCOMP_RET_EMULATE (?) may be used to jum= p >> to a specific process address, to emulate the syscall in an easier way= >> than only relying on a {c,e}BPF program. >> >=20 > This could indeed be done, but I think that Tycho's approach is much > cleaner and probably faster. >=20 I like it too but how does this handle file descriptors? --F0X3aGkiRSyJCWu2SB4Vbzc5KAEyYJSt8-- --7ETR9AiFPQ2Uq7fMG9rud0cfSy2GGUryC Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEEUysCyY8er9Axt7hqIt7+33O9apUFAlrBV3oACgkQIt7+33O9 apW/BwgAqUk8+THqVZY7dPxk0Y4kTe3qwu9scB3Kx57Cx/v+cMpbmeySP9XJthTo YDTcKLyeCiHJofBXFqxDq1AI0rtPJNgPRmhS8I038dnQf3qPr/kLdVd0uVJ79ugv H7GeP46pPrPXTw3/JZlJVm9c9TtsCYLFxVNt+rwNgNtm9y5vhN7D8WEKthS8dwb1 kfc2HdNTGnlXGtz4ZKOhUg5YceNmgcL6kvX2GswUZ2D7YRZBhMDfoD/JvGqTli8q dQUGma4Dr9bbzzJhkdNG7uSJTHM2G0EIeWSGOZ+6Zmm5210JPJ1OUdDcNrApuInp qrmx31lKVQgLKbsqitN79O2Bsos9AA== =eLbl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --7ETR9AiFPQ2Uq7fMG9rud0cfSy2GGUryC--