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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n5si3078092pfi.360.2018.04.03.17.00.16; Tue, 03 Apr 2018 17:00:30 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=fail header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20161025 header.b=o5VkQAas; dkim=fail header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.s=google header.b=TwiKmmrE; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755974AbeDCX7A (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 3 Apr 2018 19:59:00 -0400 Received: from mail-io0-f193.google.com ([209.85.223.193]:42809 "EHLO mail-io0-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754363AbeDCX65 (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Apr 2018 19:58:57 -0400 Received: by mail-io0-f193.google.com with SMTP id d5so24104122iob.9; Tue, 03 Apr 2018 16:58:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=OpItFCcIXs5I4iw+U7cSvwWXAJ2QmFq2xqIwmiIK6zo=; b=o5VkQAasWMSG3pW9XVA0A4aQoDbnkuZHTH74MBHF1TntNEB2ItEWhpBNFxeR7uN3tC yAEpnpM4oVvjrhBTb9muOzh+SVZlkMu4zTFtQZFHXBJiL89rbnvH03XhooSEBXRgUtzx iZxL7hsd0GDUP69zwQV3ABE/VaFffD7k7sg0pKeHJgHz34fjyM0/xJu0wT06khT8VQUf AChiW3YOrcU+zyxo0cUWwWaQRxSZmuV2HE+yQwFU+QR+YqnuDQWlT53SzScvda5YzBOm HmJ+ZdDQakWwa4YcCAR2tPR5sWCjOGW1r7fBK+JkiYXovd7yAPpHelwm52gojF+ZYyIA SGZQ== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux-foundation.org; s=google; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=OpItFCcIXs5I4iw+U7cSvwWXAJ2QmFq2xqIwmiIK6zo=; b=TwiKmmrEZdmdvR2qq4KjBrxvdxGaB4rkaRJkXpJZ+f6mQe3LIZvgDa4W70FimVJ+fb U6UXzHf+kOuSdaJGiv3tiKF8jN4gG6E7SCUof9/SQBuIkHxqxk/u9KQubGHW57QKAgrW eT/Tn9BAYfnr9Cb+4JLPb43r0QP2LQio/BPhg= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from :date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=OpItFCcIXs5I4iw+U7cSvwWXAJ2QmFq2xqIwmiIK6zo=; b=QwpmkisGgFJ6e6KHVZPAX3n8me6X6gWFGSPIolAeRwxVFKBWnBczwzG6NtdTQbvuYs 1LlkOqjlktXX5zqyMYAhXSOFYsWaL9EBCgU3b67MfRuyKlby8x+tt9wjHrE/5pmtHDiC WCK+2u/8cvnNSnUa+cCgV8nc0/HCNDl3/suNJE12+vV1L1HCtXSPGowwT134Kqlwy80y /AMmiONN6x4MFjusp8n3zozFudvyLASX6xJuI0BMGOWb0BmXb6/GvzsMIE+GddwMG9qA Lst/lkyUIdVSXJMjl6JgehBJRmZ8zxsCnpvVG/yt22LTxOaI+affzsfA3wWXjYgxx/gJ sTKQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALQs6tASklxiDZtDjmVM+aPPSpe4b+JCN1gvyryF+tIvG/cfjq4PXZKJ 5ldMKO97DwwADUs0G+9AE9SxQRqQnPro92jxA/g= X-Received: by 10.107.111.25 with SMTP id k25mr5851142ioc.257.1522799936429; Tue, 03 Apr 2018 16:58:56 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.95.15 with HTTP; Tue, 3 Apr 2018 16:58:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <11444.1522799762@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <4136.1522452584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <186aeb7e-1225-4bb8-3ff5-863a1cde86de@kernel.org> <30459.1522739219@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9758.1522775763@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13189.1522784944@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9349.1522794769@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <11444.1522799762@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 16:58:55 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: cyyq1T8pU33kVQr3hGhmfEyM2kY Message-ID: Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot To: David Howells Cc: Matthew Garrett , Andrew Lutomirski , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , Alan Cox , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Justin Forbes , linux-man , joeyli , LSM List , Linux API , Kees Cook , linux-efi Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:56 PM, David Howells wrote: => > Most users haven't even given this a moment's thought, aren't even aware of > the issues, don't even know to ask and, for them, it makes no difference. > They trust their distribution to deal with stuff they don't know about. Right. Like perhaps trusting the distribution to just enable all those security measures _regaredless_ of whether they booted in using secure boot or not? See? If lockdown breaks something, the distro would need to fix it regardless of secure boot. So why is the enablement dependent on it again? I'm not arguing "lockdown shouldn't be on". I'm arguing "lockdown being on or off has _nothing_ to do with whether the machine was booted in EFI mode with secure boot or not". You don't seem to get it. Linus