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Date:   Wed, 4 Apr 2018 15:02:33 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        luto@kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, jmorris@namei.org,
        Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        jforbes@redhat.com, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, jlee@suse.com,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
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On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 08:57:43AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 04:30:18AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > What I'm afraid of is this turning into a "security" feature that ends up
> > being circumvented in most scenarios where it's currently deployed - eg,
> > module signatures are mostly worthless in the non-lockdown case because you
> > can just grab the sig_enforce symbol address and then kexec a preamble that
> > flips it back to N regardless of the kernel config.
> 
> Whoa.  Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec?  Put another away, why
> isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be
> used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context?

Because no one is afraid of that :)

greg k-h