Received: by 10.213.65.68 with SMTP id h4csp879732imn; Wed, 4 Apr 2018 08:46:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx4+1JLvnfFwQXcQoWNnriBXlFLxIjA8/7s/TU2RCHxDKTABvd9ihQVVkkkuAAmKskGIUSJdV X-Received: by 10.99.150.2 with SMTP id c2mr12356078pge.352.1522856818119; Wed, 04 Apr 2018 08:46:58 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1522856818; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=I5eAevV0Dn6JqNYzBOeFR7mag3ptT3FFEr2jTeltUbIMSXdIVgi+fg/p3xaU9W/7tT rHiHRD44w15uCScGjYtezBW4hLOo23L5VVyy55nTY9bfnJkhijaypya3WF8x1WhKJVcx p+KaamQUyI9rCf6lb4fXByE8y2gohDAaD07bktulPU1FsEg4XJTW7FUEY3IUAw3wiqpr k4f2p0d43X7dqQcrVLRF/Bvg8nkVs9tyxc+AjDl5zJHa6H9D3/EM6saiRF6Vjx2VxZ2F Dlk0i12Pv7r6LGOiDDzb6jjM3Bcn0ulwaXghwRkWTyO0ZnMbeWpaSdQE1ZtNhLoFaNuL 62VQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:subject:mime-version:user-agent :message-id:in-reply-to:date:references:cc:to:from :arc-authentication-results; bh=ao4JyiwCPhYkCC+N5zAsBUCjOEVsXruvdT09CdJLO3o=; b=oGrlVwLV3ZM6d4T8DEiVU3kH7vioCpHtQt59SfEXkHuHK1KhguSS70aGAaSKp8l3rs f8iFoeeTaEB/BcRyvH4y/ZATiZspWfaBAIu59HAT3GZyffnBYHdX98/PsS7EJYFqHOIg Q4nA1Od68azlw34w3m1ft/mBvxkNErSGunMhpiWxiEZOducgEci4kdFaTHTWP6BO4Yi3 PjAb6547uqJSyTYrlXV1g0F890gdAZjT8eDS3bMDVxEG2Os+3jSJEkf0OlieRDcCjDE8 6/mMIpY3HItHzUYsFVTmByd0L8Kl7yAbB/BI7nQC508vM7MuO6nAuAjSAMYzpNmPRvpa lK+w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d9si3847422pga.776.2018.04.04.08.46.38; Wed, 04 Apr 2018 08:46:58 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751941AbeDDPpL (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 4 Apr 2018 11:45:11 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:58139 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751466AbeDDPpI (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Apr 2018 11:45:08 -0400 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1f3kaw-0006k0-Kh; Wed, 04 Apr 2018 09:45:06 -0600 Received: from 67-3-145-25.omah.qwest.net ([67.3.145.25] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1f3kav-0007rS-Pt; Wed, 04 Apr 2018 09:45:06 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: David Howells Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Jann Horn , Linus Torvalds , Matthew Garrett , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , Alan Cox , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Justin Forbes , linux-man , joeyli , LSM List , Linux API , Kees Cook , linux-efi References: <30459.1522739219@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9758.1522775763@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13189.1522784944@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9349.1522794769@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20736.1522829117@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 10:43:57 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20736.1522829117@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (David Howells's message of "Wed, 04 Apr 2018 09:05:17 +0100") Message-ID: <87fu4bj7sy.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1f3kav-0007rS-Pt;;;mid=<87fu4bj7sy.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=67.3.145.25;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+Ck+qhCKGvXg7Sf9Tw5GDCuSznbdYMMI4= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 67.3.145.25 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on sa01.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.1 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,TVD_RCVD_IP,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,XMSubMetaSxObfu_03, XMSubMetaSx_00 autolearn=disabled version=3.4.0 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa01 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 1.2 XMSubMetaSxObfu_03 Obfuscated Sexy Noun-People * 1.0 XMSubMetaSx_00 1+ Sexy Words X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa01 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **;David Howells X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 476 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.06 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.3 (0.7%), b_tie_ro: 2.3 (0.5%), parse: 1.38 (0.3%), extract_message_metadata: 4.6 (1.0%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.95 (0.4%), tests_pri_-1000: 8 (1.7%), tests_pri_-950: 2.2 (0.5%), tests_pri_-900: 1.72 (0.4%), tests_pri_-400: 35 (7.3%), check_bayes: 33 (6.9%), b_tokenize: 14 (2.9%), b_tok_get_all: 8 (1.8%), b_comp_prob: 4.5 (1.0%), b_tok_touch_all: 2.9 (0.6%), b_finish: 0.82 (0.2%), tests_pri_0: 392 (82.2%), check_dkim_signature: 0.88 (0.2%), check_dkim_adsp: 4.4 (0.9%), tests_pri_500: 7 (1.4%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org David Howells writes: > Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> As far as I can tell, what's really going on here is that there's a >> significant contingent here that wants to prevent Linux from >> chainloading something that isn't Linux. > > You have completely the wrong end of the stick. No one has said that or even > implied that. You are alleging dishonesty on our part. > > What we *have* said is that *if* we want to pass the secure boot state across > kexec, then we have to make sure that: > > (1) no one tampers with the intermediate kernel between boot and kexec > otherwise the secure boot state is effectively invalidated, and > > (2) the image that gets kexec'ed is trusted. > > Remember: you cannot know (2) if you don't have (1). > > And if someone tampers with the aim of breaking, say, Windows, then someone, > e.g. Microsoft, might blacklist the shim. *Wow* You just denied this isn't about not booting Windows and a few lines later said that is your concern. I was thinking I would have to dig up old archives where I had been told this before, but you just nicely repeated all of the old arguments so I don't see the point. Eric