Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <32d3e7a6-36f0-571a-bb91-67f746c7eafa@schaufler-ca.com>
References: <cover.1521179281.git.rgb@redhat.com> <e284617ad667ad8f17958dd8babb87fe1b4d7205.1521179281.git.rgb@redhat.com>
 <CAHC9VhTyvxxj2e2Gn+iyW6iLLeYB7hp8a+JvfeMmJ2nUPqtEaw@mail.gmail.com> <32d3e7a6-36f0-571a-bb91-67f746c7eafa@schaufler-ca.com>
From:   Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date:   Wed, 18 Apr 2018 20:46:45 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTz-pr-iUVv-+R3ShwEKSHDsweDGuN7255HV7Cu3ZYPEw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 01/13] audit: add container id
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
        containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@redhat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, luto@kernel.org,
        jlayton@redhat.com, carlos@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
        viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, simo@redhat.com,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, serge@hallyn.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 8:41 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 4/18/2018 4:47 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
>>> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
>>> emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
>>> ...
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
>>> index d258826..1b82191 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
>>> @@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ struct task_struct {
>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>>>         kuid_t                          loginuid;
>>>         unsigned int                    sessionid;
>>> +       u64                             containerid;
>> This one line addition to the task_struct scares me the most of
>> anything in this patchset.  Why?  It's a field named "containerid" in
>> a perhaps one of the most widely used core kernel structures; the
>> possibilities for abuse are endless, and it's foolish to think we
>> would ever be able to adequately police this.
>
> If we can get the LSM infrastructure managed task blobs from
> module stacking in ahead of this we could create a trivial security
> module to manage this. It's not as if there aren't all sorts of
> interactions between security modules and the audit system already.

While yes, there are plenty of interactions between the two, it is
possible to use audit without the LSMs and I would like to preserve
that.  Further, I don't want to entangle two very complicated code
changes or make the audit container ID effort dependent on LSM
stacking.

You're a good salesman Casey, but you're not that good ;)

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com