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Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 07/24] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks [ver #7] From: David Howells To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 14:31:51 +0100 Message-ID: <152414471151.23902.13878490698594523635.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <152414466005.23902.12967974041384198114.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <152414466005.23902.12967974041384198114.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.11.54.5 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.6]); Thu, 19 Apr 2018 13:31:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.6]); Thu, 19 Apr 2018 13:31:53 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.5' DOMAIN:'int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'dhowells@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM. Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Casey Schaufler cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 309 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 0b414836bebd..549aaa46353b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "smack.h" #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE" @@ -521,6 +522,307 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) return rc; } +/* + * Mount context operations + */ + +struct smack_fs_context { + union { + struct { + char *fsdefault; + char *fsfloor; + char *fshat; + char *fsroot; + char *fstransmute; + }; + char *ptrs[5]; + + }; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + bool transmute; +}; + +/** + * smack_fs_context_free - Free the security data from a filesystem context + * @fc: The filesystem context to be cleaned up. + */ +static void smack_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security; + int i; + + if (ctx) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->ptrs); i++) + kfree(ctx->ptrs[i]); + kfree(ctx->isp); + kfree(ctx->sbsp); + kfree(ctx); + fc->security = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * smack_fs_context_alloc - Allocate security data for a filesystem context + * @fc: The filesystem context. + * @src_sb: Reference superblock (automount/reconfigure) or NULL + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_fs_context_alloc(struct fs_context *fc, + struct super_block *src_sb) +{ + struct smack_fs_context *ctx; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct smack_known *skp; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + goto nomem; + fc->security = ctx; + + sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sbsp) + goto nomem_free; + ctx->sbsp = sbsp; + + isp = new_inode_smack(NULL); + if (!isp) + goto nomem_free; + ctx->isp = isp; + + if (src_sb) { + if (src_sb->s_security) + memcpy(sbsp, src_sb->s_security, sizeof(*sbsp)); + } else if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + /* Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller. */ + skp = smk_of_current(); + sbsp->smk_root = skp; + sbsp->smk_default = skp; + } else { + sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor; + sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor; + sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor; + sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat; + /* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */ + } + + return 0; + +nomem_free: + smack_fs_context_free(fc); +nomem: + return -ENOMEM; +} + +/** + * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication + * @fc: The new filesystem context. + * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated. + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, + struct fs_context *src_fc) +{ + struct smack_fs_context *dst, *src = src_fc->security; + int i; + + dst = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dst) + goto nomem; + fc->security = dst; + + dst->sbsp = kmemdup(src->sbsp, sizeof(struct superblock_smack), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dst->sbsp) + goto nomem_free; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dst->ptrs); i++) { + if (src->ptrs[i]) { + dst->ptrs[i] = kstrdup(src->ptrs[i], GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dst->ptrs[i]) + goto nomem_free; + } + } + + return 0; + +nomem_free: + smack_fs_context_free(fc); +nomem: + return -ENOMEM; +} + +/** + * smack_fs_context_parse_option - Parse a single mount option + * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed. + * @opt: The option text buffer. + * @len: The length of the text. + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_fs_context_parse_option(struct fs_context *fc, char *p, size_t len) +{ + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + int rc = -ENOMEM; + int token; + + /* Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values. */ + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args); + switch (token) { + case Opt_fsdefault: + if (ctx->fsdefault) + goto error_dup; + ctx->fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!ctx->fsdefault) + goto error; + break; + case Opt_fsfloor: + if (ctx->fsfloor) + goto error_dup; + ctx->fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!ctx->fsfloor) + goto error; + break; + case Opt_fshat: + if (ctx->fshat) + goto error_dup; + ctx->fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!ctx->fshat) + goto error; + break; + case Opt_fsroot: + if (ctx->fsroot) + goto error_dup; + ctx->fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!ctx->fsroot) + goto error; + break; + case Opt_fstransmute: + if (ctx->fstransmute) + goto error_dup; + ctx->fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!ctx->fstransmute) + goto error; + break; + default: + pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n"); + goto error_inval; + } + + return 0; + +error_dup: + pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount option\n"); +error_inval: + rc = -EINVAL; +error: + return rc; +} + +/** + * smack_fs_context_validate - Validate the filesystem context security data + * @fc: The filesystem context. + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_fs_context_validate(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = ctx->sbsp; + struct inode_smack *isp = ctx->isp; + struct smack_known *skp; + + if (ctx->fsdefault) { + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fsdefault, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sbsp->smk_default = skp; + } + + if (ctx->fsfloor) { + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fsfloor, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sbsp->smk_floor = skp; + } + + if (ctx->fshat) { + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fshat, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sbsp->smk_hat = skp; + } + + if (ctx->fsroot || ctx->fstransmute) { + skp = smk_import_entry(ctx->fstransmute ?: ctx->fsroot, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sbsp->smk_root = skp; + ctx->transmute = !!ctx->fstransmute; + } + + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; + return 0; +} + +/** + * smack_sb_get_tree - Assign the context to a newly created superblock + * @fc: The new filesystem context. + * + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. + */ +static int smack_sb_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct smack_fs_context *ctx = fc->security; + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = ctx->sbsp; + struct dentry *root = fc->root; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root); + struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb; + struct inode_smack *isp; + bool transmute = ctx->transmute; + + if (sb->s_security) + return 0; + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + /* + * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled + * backing store it's okay to trust security labels + * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted. + */ + if (fc->user_ns != &init_user_ns && + sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC && + sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) { + transmute = true; + sbsp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED; + } + } + + sbsp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED; + sb->s_security = sbsp; + ctx->sbsp = NULL; + + /* Initialize the root inode. */ + isp = inode->i_security; + if (isp == NULL) { + isp = ctx->isp; + ctx->isp = NULL; + inode->i_security = isp; + } else + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; + + if (transmute) + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; + + return 0; +} /* * Superblock Hooks. @@ -4628,6 +4930,13 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_alloc, smack_fs_context_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_free, smack_fs_context_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_option, smack_fs_context_parse_option), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_validate, smack_fs_context_validate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_get_tree, smack_sb_get_tree), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),