Received: by 10.192.165.148 with SMTP id m20csp350700imm; Fri, 20 Apr 2018 07:48:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx4+kXkuuCqaigKxB7/z1cnKZRLS4mSUAbThM/EMngC8fEN/HyT1STSZ8IL44re0gL64dPgYA X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:6b03:: with SMTP id o3-v6mr10367701plk.213.1524235706657; Fri, 20 Apr 2018 07:48:26 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1524235706; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=VHeBicft7/DEHjigQIUpHW8wzebxh6rUkJQe8JO4d7BmaSFi0+H142SAPag+ktbvAX 9+x5J9linhmZxwgFDkA0yiIouqKYXvKVbGiqFYjdFZKvl+YfJujxGzl9e+e7IkD327Qc 41xm9wxYnxvaIPtccVvmkliTcWzw2f6qEE45wZsaAPOgaHap0J2ogr6R03a7HqcPl2xf kXJt9RfbfbbDYTdBFxV3oaQhjsnOnWWL9wz3ttP6etBfuWz+Keebz/ga35Y/r8B33Vqx pWtYvxHHn0W4hEjFXg7jfrKcVUsbkZjp7oeuW1bhsyzfcfPsyP4H/j+CzPIN9k4vuDAO GsaA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:subject:references:in-reply-to:message-id :date:cc:to:from:arc-authentication-results; bh=Myalt3djx8xqfp/Ped/xLM0ebDjraXYd4Fdbb0iU6sU=; b=tgPhyhhs2bf+lQN/Ce+1XuhWoj/TwDPdqQ1BknTIziztj1bnomsIgZJYAhOqEwgo+9 nd1IPLZf15uDTOH7DDdwHC9ts6YBkmqY90sfjmSaa4wkdSlDUxcG4lBJloLhIt334Vqe f19li3DWA31T9fGIpkID0trQnOsoI6syW7WjvYroOG/K1G8aC9r3wMM27cjan81ArDuz kBRmB76yMOvFXalePK5K2kDhaSFssxQchREPr98NW61ztcx7padmjlL5JTBt3si7I1LB 81BLLfgUIIE1fTSHxzLJPE5hsiOjH30nO6yxj3w9zXMgpjPSibW+FuK2QzxduR5csBld /p1g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id f9si4759858pgs.667.2018.04.20.07.48.12; Fri, 20 Apr 2018 07:48:26 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755364AbeDTOqM (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 20 Apr 2018 10:46:12 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:36378 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755165AbeDTOqB (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Apr 2018 10:46:01 -0400 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1f9XIX-0003UZ-AK; Fri, 20 Apr 2018 08:46:01 -0600 Received: from [97.119.174.25] (helo=x220.int.ebiederm.org) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1f9XDo-0006Ha-5m; Fri, 20 Apr 2018 08:41:23 -0600 From: "Eric W. Biederman" To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" , Jonas Bonn , Stefan Kristiansson , Stafford Horne , openrisc@lists.librecores.org Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 09:38:00 -0500 Message-Id: <20180420143811.9994-11-ebiederm@xmission.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1 In-Reply-To: <87604mhrnb.fsf@xmission.com> References: <87604mhrnb.fsf@xmission.com> X-XM-SPF: eid=1f9XDo-0006Ha-5m;;;mid=<20180420143811.9994-11-ebiederm@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=97.119.174.25;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19Ihac0nOE8QLMTjZdFYtG7hgPS6xFmrWI= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 97.119.174.25 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.1 (2015-04-28) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: *** X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.6 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,TR_Symld_Words,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_TooManySym_01, XMNoVowels,XMSolicitRefs_0,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.1 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 1.5 TR_Symld_Words too many words that have symbols inside * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.1 XMSolicitRefs_0 Weightloss drug X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ***;linux-arch@vger.kernel.org X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 15037 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.04 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 2.7 (0.0%), b_tie_ro: 1.86 (0.0%), parse: 0.85 (0.0%), extract_message_metadata: 20 (0.1%), get_uri_detail_list: 3.2 (0.0%), tests_pri_-1000: 3.0 (0.0%), tests_pri_-950: 1.28 (0.0%), tests_pri_-900: 1.05 (0.0%), tests_pri_-400: 40 (0.3%), check_bayes: 39 (0.3%), b_tokenize: 20 (0.1%), b_tok_get_all: 9 (0.1%), b_comp_prob: 2.2 (0.0%), b_tok_touch_all: 5 (0.0%), b_finish: 0.64 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 342 (2.3%), check_dkim_signature: 0.52 (0.0%), check_dkim_adsp: 3.4 (0.0%), tests_pri_500: 14624 (97.3%), poll_dns_idle: 14606 (97.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH 11/22] signal/openrisc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Filling in struct siginfo before calling force_sig_info a tedious and error prone process, where once in a great while the wrong fields are filled out, and siginfo has been inconsistently cleared. Simplify this process by using the helper force_sig_fault. Which takes as a parameters all of the information it needs, ensures all of the fiddly bits of filling in struct siginfo are done properly and then calls force_sig_info. In short about a 5 line reduction in code for every time force_sig_info is called, which makes the calling function clearer. Cc: Jonas Bonn Cc: Stefan Kristiansson Cc: Stafford Horne Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c | 33 ++++----------------------------- arch/openrisc/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++-------------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c index 1610b1d65a11..fac246e6f37a 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c @@ -250,28 +250,16 @@ void __init trap_init(void) asmlinkage void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { - siginfo_t info; - clear_siginfo(&info); - info.si_signo = SIGTRAP; - info.si_code = TRAP_TRACE; - info.si_addr = (void *)address; - force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, current); + force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_TRACE, (void __user *)address, current); regs->pc += 4; } asmlinkage void do_unaligned_access(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { - siginfo_t info; - if (user_mode(regs)) { /* Send a SIGBUS */ - clear_siginfo(&info); - info.si_signo = SIGBUS; - info.si_errno = 0; - info.si_code = BUS_ADRALN; - info.si_addr = (void __user *)address; - force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, current); + force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)address, current); } else { printk("KERNEL: Unaligned Access 0x%.8lx\n", address); show_registers(regs); @@ -282,16 +270,9 @@ asmlinkage void do_unaligned_access(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) asmlinkage void do_bus_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { - siginfo_t info; - if (user_mode(regs)) { /* Send a SIGBUS */ - clear_siginfo(&info); - info.si_signo = SIGBUS; - info.si_errno = 0; - info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR; - info.si_addr = (void *)address; - force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, current); + force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)address, current); } else { /* Kernel mode */ printk("KERNEL: Bus error (SIGBUS) 0x%.8lx\n", address); show_registers(regs); @@ -466,7 +447,6 @@ static inline void simulate_swa(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, asmlinkage void do_illegal_instruction(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { - siginfo_t info; unsigned int op; unsigned int insn = *((unsigned int *)address); @@ -487,12 +467,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_illegal_instruction(struct pt_regs *regs, if (user_mode(regs)) { /* Send a SIGILL */ - clear_siginfo(&info); - info.si_signo = SIGILL; - info.si_errno = 0; - info.si_code = ILL_ILLOPC; - info.si_addr = (void *)address; - force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, current); + force_sig_fault(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, (void __user *)address, current); } else { /* Kernel mode */ printk("KERNEL: Illegal instruction (SIGILL) 0x%.8lx\n", address); diff --git a/arch/openrisc/mm/fault.c b/arch/openrisc/mm/fault.c index 68be33e4ae17..9f011d16cc46 100644 --- a/arch/openrisc/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/openrisc/mm/fault.c @@ -52,11 +52,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, struct task_struct *tsk; struct mm_struct *mm; struct vm_area_struct *vma; - siginfo_t info; + int si_code; int fault; unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE; - clear_siginfo(&info); tsk = current; /* @@ -98,7 +97,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, } mm = tsk->mm; - info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR; + si_code = SEGV_MAPERR; /* * If we're in an interrupt or have no user @@ -140,7 +139,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, */ good_area: - info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; + si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; /* first do some preliminary protection checks */ @@ -214,11 +213,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, /* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */ if (user_mode(regs)) { - info.si_signo = SIGSEGV; - info.si_errno = 0; - /* info.si_code has been set above */ - info.si_addr = (void *)address; - force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk); + force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, (void __user *)address, tsk); return; } @@ -283,11 +278,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, * Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel * or user mode. */ - info.si_signo = SIGBUS; - info.si_errno = 0; - info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR; - info.si_addr = (void *)address; - force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, tsk); + force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)address, tsk); /* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */ if (!user_mode(regs)) -- 2.14.1