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Biederman) To: Christian Brauner Cc: davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, avagin@virtuozzo.com, ktkhai@virtuozzo.com, serge@hallyn.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org References: <20180424204335.12904-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> <20180424204335.12904-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 16:54:41 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20180424204335.12904-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (Christian Brauner's message of "Tue, 24 Apr 2018 22:43:34 +0200") Message-ID: <87d0yo46e6.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1fB5uv-00064c-Qd;;;mid=<87d0yo46e6.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=97.119.174.25;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX18lYvaMO/lI9yEmXmUIPVInKb1D6aAC/UI= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 97.119.174.25 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.1 (2015-04-28) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.0 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_TooManySym_01,T_XMDrugObfuBody_14 autolearn=disabled version=3.4.1 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.2 T_XMDrugObfuBody_14 obfuscated drug references * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Christian Brauner X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 15028 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.03 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 2.7 (0.0%), b_tie_ro: 1.95 (0.0%), parse: 0.82 (0.0%), extract_message_metadata: 17 (0.1%), get_uri_detail_list: 3.6 (0.0%), tests_pri_-1000: 2.7 (0.0%), tests_pri_-950: 1.13 (0.0%), tests_pri_-900: 0.98 (0.0%), tests_pri_-400: 32 (0.2%), check_bayes: 31 (0.2%), b_tokenize: 11 (0.1%), b_tok_get_all: 10 (0.1%), b_comp_prob: 3.4 (0.0%), b_tok_touch_all: 3.7 (0.0%), b_finish: 0.60 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 342 (2.3%), check_dkim_signature: 0.67 (0.0%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.9 (0.0%), tests_pri_500: 14626 (97.3%), poll_dns_idle: 14617 (97.3%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2 v2] netns: restrict uevents X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org We already do this in practice in userspace. It doesn't make much sense to perform this delivery. So we might as well make this optimization. Christian Brauner writes: > commit 07e98962fa77 ("kobject: Send hotplug events in all network namespaces") > > enabled sending hotplug events into all network namespaces back in 2010. > Over time the set of uevents that get sent into all network namespaces has > shrunk a little. We have now reached the point where hotplug events for all > devices that carry a namespace tag are filtered according to that > namespace. Specifically, they are filtered whenever the namespace tag of > the kobject does not match the namespace tag of the netlink socket. One > example are network devices. Uevents for network devices only show up in > the network namespaces these devices are moved to or created in. > > However, any uevent for a kobject that does not have a namespace tag > associated with it will not be filtered and we will broadcast it into all > network namespaces. This behavior stopped making sense when user namespaces > were introduced. > > This patch restricts uevents to the initial user namespace for a couple of > reasons that have been extensively discusses on the mailing list [1]. > - Thundering herd: > Broadcasting uevents into all network namespaces introduces significant > overhead. > All processes that listen to uevents running in non-initial user > namespaces will end up responding to uevents that will be meaningless to > them. Mainly, because non-initial user namespaces cannot easily manage > devices unless they have a privileged host-process helping them out. This > means that there will be a thundering herd of activity when there > shouldn't be any. > - Uevents from non-root users are already filtered in userspace: > Uevents are filtered by userspace in a user namespace because the > received uid != 0. Instead the uid associated with the event will be > 65534 == "nobody" because the global root uid is not mapped. > This means we can safely and without introducing regressions modify the > kernel to not send uevents into all network namespaces whose owning user > namespace is not the initial user namespace because we know that > userspace will ignore the message because of the uid anyway. I have > a) verified that is is true for every udev implementation out there b) > that this behavior has been present in all udev implementations from the > very beginning. > - Removing needless overhead/Increasing performance: > Currently, the uevent socket for each network namespace is added to the > global variable uevent_sock_list. The list itself needs to be protected > by a mutex. So everytime a uevent is generated the mutex is taken on the > list. The mutex is held *from the creation of the uevent (memory > allocation, string creation etc. until all uevent sockets have been > handled*. This is aggravated by the fact that for each uevent socket that > has listeners the mc_list must be walked as well which means we're > talking O(n^2) here. Given that a standard Linux workload usually has > quite a lot of network namespaces and - in the face of containers - a lot > of user namespaces this quickly becomes a performance problem (see > "Thundering herd" above). By just recording uevent sockets of network > namespaces that are owned by the initial user namespace we significantly > increase performance in this codepath. > - Injecting uevents: > There's a valid argument that containers might be interested in receiving > device events especially if they are delegated to them by a privileged > userspace process. One prime example are SR-IOV enabled devices that are > explicitly designed to be handed of to other users such as VMs or > containers. > This use-case can now be correctly handled since > commit 692ec06d7c92 ("netns: send uevent messages"). This commit > introduced the ability to send uevents from userspace. As such we can let > a sufficiently privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the owning user namespace of > the network namespace of the netlink socket) userspace process make a > decision what uevents should be sent. This removes the need to blindly > broadcast uevents into all user namespaces and provides a performant and > safe solution to this problem. > - Filtering logic: > This patch filters by *owning user namespace of the network namespace a > given task resides in* and not by user namespace of the task per se. This > means if the user namespace of a given task is unshared but the network > namespace is kept and is owned by the initial user namespace a listener > that is opening the uevent socket in that network namespace can still > listen to uevents. > > [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/4/739 > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" > --- > Changelog v1->v2: > * patch unchanged > Changelog v0->v1: > * patch unchanged > --- > lib/kobject_uevent.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/lib/kobject_uevent.c b/lib/kobject_uevent.c > index 15ea216a67ce..f5f5038787ac 100644 > --- a/lib/kobject_uevent.c > +++ b/lib/kobject_uevent.c > @@ -703,9 +703,13 @@ static int uevent_net_init(struct net *net) > > net->uevent_sock = ue_sk; > > - mutex_lock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > - list_add_tail(&ue_sk->list, &uevent_sock_list); > - mutex_unlock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > + /* Restrict uevents to initial user namespace. */ > + if (sock_net(ue_sk->sk)->user_ns == &init_user_ns) { > + mutex_lock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > + list_add_tail(&ue_sk->list, &uevent_sock_list); > + mutex_unlock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > + } > + > return 0; > } > > @@ -713,9 +717,11 @@ static void uevent_net_exit(struct net *net) > { > struct uevent_sock *ue_sk = net->uevent_sock; > > - mutex_lock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > - list_del(&ue_sk->list); > - mutex_unlock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > + if (sock_net(ue_sk->sk)->user_ns == &init_user_ns) { > + mutex_lock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > + list_del(&ue_sk->list); > + mutex_unlock(&uevent_sock_mutex); > + } > > netlink_kernel_release(ue_sk->sk); > kfree(ue_sk);