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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
        Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.16 045/113] ALSA: control: Hardening for potential Spectre v1
Date:   Mon, 30 Apr 2018 12:24:16 -0700
Message-Id: <20180430184016.950348790@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.16-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 088e861edffb84879cf0c0d1b02eda078c3a0ffe upstream.

As recently Smatch suggested, a few places in ALSA control core codes
may expand the array directly from the user-space value with
speculation:

  sound/core/control.c:1003 snd_ctl_elem_lock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:1031 snd_ctl_elem_unlock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:844 snd_ctl_elem_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:891 snd_ctl_elem_read() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:939 snd_ctl_elem_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'

Although all these seem doing only the first load without further
reference, we may want to stay in a safer side, so hardening with
array_index_nospec() would still make sense.

In this patch, we put array_index_nospec() to the common
snd_ctl_get_ioff*() helpers instead of each caller.  These helpers are
also referred from some drivers, too, and basically all usages are to
calculate the array index from the user-space value, hence it's better
to cover there.

BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/sound/control.h |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/include/sound/control.h
+++ b/include/sound/control.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <sound/asound.h>
 
 #define snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol) ((kcontrol)->private_data)
@@ -148,12 +149,14 @@ int snd_ctl_get_preferred_subdevice(stru
 
 static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioffnum(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
 {
-	return id->numid - kctl->id.numid;
+	unsigned int ioff = id->numid - kctl->id.numid;
+	return array_index_nospec(ioff, kctl->count);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioffidx(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
 {
-	return id->index - kctl->id.index;
+	unsigned int ioff = id->index - kctl->id.index;
+	return array_index_nospec(ioff, kctl->count);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioff(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)