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Message-Id: <5AE9DC1D02000078001C0370@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
Date:   Wed, 02 May 2018 09:41:17 -0600
From:   "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To:     "Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc:     "xen-devel" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
        "Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/4] xen/PVH: Set up GS segment for
 stack canary
References: <20180430162339.17143-1-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
 <20180430162339.17143-4-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
 <5AE973CD02000078001C008E@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
 <615b0e30-c360-3ad4-f1b3-0e907d790643@oracle.com>
 <5AE9D2DD02000078001C02F0@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
 <6729d0ff-31ff-779d-6d6f-511f9ee29e50@oracle.com>
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>>> On 02.05.18 at 17:22, <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> wrote:
> On 05/02/2018 11:01 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 02.05.18 at 17:00, <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> wrote:
>>> On 05/02/2018 04:16 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>> On 30.04.18 at 18:23, <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-pvh.S
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-pvh.S
>>>>> @@ -54,6 +54,9 @@
>>>>>   * charge of setting up it's own stack, GDT and IDT.
>>>>>   */
>>>>>  
>>>>> +#define PVH_GDT_ENTRY_CANARY    4
>>>>> +#define PVH_CANARY_SEL          (PVH_GDT_ENTRY_CANARY * 8)
>>>> I can only advise against doing it this way: There's no safeguard against
>>>> someone changing asm/segment.h without changing this value (in fact
>>>> this applies to all of the GDT selectors populated in this file). At the 
>>> very
>>>> least tie this to GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_TSS / __BOOT_TSS?
>>>>
>>>>> @@ -64,6 +67,9 @@ ENTRY(pvh_start_xen)
>>>>>  	mov %eax,%es
>>>>>  	mov %eax,%ss
>>>>>  
>>>>> +	mov $(PVH_CANARY_SEL),%eax
>>>>> +	mov %eax,%gs
>>>>> +
>>>>>  	/* Stash hvm_start_info. */
>>>>>  	mov $_pa(pvh_start_info), %edi
>>>>>  	mov %ebx, %esi
>>>>> @@ -150,6 +156,7 @@ gdt_start:
>>>>>  	.quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff            /* __BOOT_CS */
>>>>>  #endif
>>>>>  	.quad 0x00cf92000000ffff            /* __BOOT_DS */
>>>>> +	.quad 0x0040900000000018            /* PVH_CANARY_SEL */
>>>> Without any further code before loading the selector, this points at
>>>> physical address 0. Don't you need to add in the base address of
>>>> the per-CPU stack_canary?
>>> This GDT is gone soon after we jump into generic x86 startup code.That
>>> code will load its own GDT (and then set up per-cpu segments and all that).
>> All understood, but why would you set up the per-CPU segment here if
>> what you load into the segment register is not usable for the intended
>> purpose (until that other code sets up things and reloads the segment
>> registers)?
> 
> The intended purpose here is to allow stack protector access not to
> fail. At this point it doesn't really matter that GS is later used for
> per-cpu segment, this code (and this GDT) will not be used when other
> CPUs come up.

But the place the canary would live this way is completely wrong. Anyway,
you're the maintainer of this code, so I guess I better shut up now.

Jan