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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x12-v6si10004314pgv.389.2018.05.02.11.20.51; Wed, 02 May 2018 11:21:06 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751347AbeEBSSh (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 2 May 2018 14:18:37 -0400 Received: from mx3-rdu2.redhat.com ([66.187.233.73]:53626 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750800AbeEBSSg (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 May 2018 14:18:36 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.4]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFEC920E4B; Wed, 2 May 2018 18:18:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from x2.localnet (ovpn-124-79.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.124.79]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 018842024CA1; Wed, 2 May 2018 18:18:34 +0000 (UTC) From: Steve Grubb To: Tyler Hicks Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Andy Lutomirski , Will Drewry , Paul Moore , Eric Paris , Jonathan Corbet , linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl Date: Wed, 02 May 2018 14:18:34 -0400 Message-ID: <2193990.pCRMhOm3SD@x2> Organization: Red Hat In-Reply-To: <1525276400-7161-4-git-send-email-tyhicks@canonical.com> References: <1525276400-7161-1-git-send-email-tyhicks@canonical.com> <1525276400-7161-4-git-send-email-tyhicks@canonical.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.4 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.1]); Wed, 02 May 2018 18:18:35 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.1]); Wed, 02 May 2018 18:18:35 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.4' DOMAIN:'int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'sgrubb@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wednesday, May 2, 2018 11:53:19 AM EDT Tyler Hicks wrote: > The decision to log a seccomp action will always be subject to the > value of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl, even for processes > that are being inspected via the audit subsystem, in an upcoming patch. > Therefore, we need to emit an audit record on attempts at writing to the > actions_logged sysctl when auditing is enabled. > > This patch updates the write handler for the actions_logged sysctl to > emit an audit record on attempts to write to the sysctl. Successful > writes to the sysctl will result in a record that includes a normalized > list of logged actions in the "actions" field and a "res" field equal to > 0. Unsuccessful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that > doesn't include the "actions" field and has a "res" field equal to 1. > > Not all unsuccessful writes to the sysctl are audited. For example, an > audit record will not be emitted if an unprivileged process attempts to > open the sysctl file for reading since that access control check is not > part of the sysctl's write handler. > > Below are some example audit records when writing various strings to the > actions_logged sysctl. > > Writing "not-a-real-action", when the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged > sysctl previously was "kill_process kill_thread trap errno trace log", > emits this audit record: > > type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525275273.537:130): op=seccomp-logging > old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=0 > > If you then write "kill_process kill_thread errno trace log", this audit > record is emitted: > > type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525275310.208:136): op=seccomp-logging > actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log > old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=1 > > If you then write the string "log log errno trace kill_process > kill_thread", which is unordered and contains the log action twice, > it results in the same actions value as the previous record: > > type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525275325.613:142): op=seccomp-logging > actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log > old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 > > No audit records are generated when reading the actions_logged sysctl. ACK for the format of the records. -Steve > Suggested-by: Steve Grubb > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ > kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > kernel/seccomp.c | 51 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 72 > insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index 75d5b03..d4e35e7 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, > const struct dentry *dentry, > const unsigned char type); > extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code); > +extern void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, > + const char *old_names, int res); > extern void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t); > > static inline bool audit_dummy_context(void) > @@ -502,6 +504,9 @@ static inline void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long > syscall, long signr, int code) { } > static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int > code) { } > +static inline void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, > + const char *old_names, int res) > +{ } > static inline int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, > struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial) > { > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 4e0a4ac..5a0b770 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -2478,6 +2478,31 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long > signr, int code) audit_log_end(ab); > } > > +void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char > *old_names, + int res) > +{ > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > + > + if (!audit_enabled) > + return; > + > + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, > + AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); > + if (unlikely(!ab)) > + return; > + > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=seccomp-logging"); > + > + if (names) > + audit_log_format(ab, " actions=%s", names); > + > + if (old_names) > + audit_log_format(ab, " old-actions=%s", old_names); > + > + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", res); > + audit_log_end(ab); > +} > + > struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) > { > struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; > diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c > index b36ac1e..da78835 100644 > --- a/kernel/seccomp.c > +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c > @@ -1219,11 +1219,10 @@ static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table > *ro_table, void __user *buffer, } > > static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user > *buffer, - size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) > + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged) > { > char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; > struct ctl_table table; > - u32 actions_logged; > int ret; > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > @@ -1238,24 +1237,58 @@ static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table > *ro_table, void __user *buffer, if (ret) > return ret; > > - if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(&actions_logged, table.data)) > + if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged, table.data)) > return -EINVAL; > > - if (actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) > + if (*actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) > return -EINVAL; > > - seccomp_actions_logged = actions_logged; > + seccomp_actions_logged = *actions_logged; > return 0; > } > > +static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged, u32 > old_actions_logged, + int ret) > +{ > + char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; > + char old_names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; > + const char *new = names; > + const char *old = old_names; > + > + if (!audit_enabled) > + return; > + > + memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); > + memset(old_names, 0, sizeof(old_names)); > + > + if (ret || !seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), > + actions_logged, ",")) > + new = NULL; > + > + if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names, sizeof(old_names), > + old_actions_logged, ",")) > + old = NULL; > + > + return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old, !ret); > +} > + > static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int > write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, > loff_t *ppos) > { > - if (write) > - return write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); > - else > - return read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); > + int ret; > + > + if (write) { > + u32 actions_logged = 0; > + u32 old_actions_logged = seccomp_actions_logged; > + > + ret = write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos, > + &actions_logged); > + audit_actions_logged(actions_logged, old_actions_logged, ret); > + } else > + ret = read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); > + > + return ret; > } > > static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = {