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R. Silva" , "David S. Miller" Subject: [PATCH 4.4 49/56] atm: zatm: Fix potential Spectre v1 Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 08:48:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20180514064759.341729745@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180514064754.853201981@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180514064754.853201981@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 upstream. pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index zatm_dev->pool_info Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/atm/zatm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/atm/zatm.c +++ b/drivers/atm/zatm.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1456,6 +1457,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *de return -EFAULT; if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL) return -EINVAL; + pool = array_index_nospec(pool, + ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1); spin_lock_irqsave(&zatm_dev->lock, flags); info = zatm_dev->pool_info[pool]; if (cmd == ZATM_GETPOOLZ) {