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Date:   Thu, 17 May 2018 17:56:00 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To:     Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc:     cgroups@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@redhat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, luto@kernel.org,
        jlayton@redhat.com, carlos@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
        viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, simo@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
        serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 01/13] audit: add container id
Message-ID: <20180517215600.dyswlkvqdtgjwr5y@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
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On 2018-05-17 17:00, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Fri, 16 Mar 2018 05:00:28 -0400
> Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a
> > process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
> > 
> > This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry
> > of the form /proc/PID/containerid where PID is the process ID of the
> > newly created task that is to become the first task in a container,
> > or an additional task added to a container.
> > 
> > The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
> > 
> > This will produce a record such as this:
> > type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519903238.968:261): op=set pid=596 uid=0
> > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 auid=0
> > tty=pts0 ses=1 opid=596 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123455
> > res=0
> 
> The was one thing I was wondering about. Currently when we set the
> loginuid, the record is AUDIT_LOGINUID. The corollary is that when we
> set the container id, the event should be AUDIT_CONTAINERID or
> AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID.

The record type is actually AUDIT_LOGIN.  The field type is
AUDIT_LOGINUID.  Given that correction, I think we're fine and could
potentially violently agree.  The existing naming is consistent.

> During syscall events, the path info is returned in a a record simply
> called AUDIT_PATH, cwd info is returned in AUDIT_CWD. So, rather than
> calling the record that gets attached to everything
> AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO, how about simply AUDIT_CONTAINER.

Considering the container initiation record is different than the record
to document the container involved in an otherwise normal syscall, we
need two names.  I don't have a strong opinion what they are.

I'd prefer AUDIT_CONTAINER and AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO so that the two are
different enough to be visually distinct while leaving
AUDIT_CONTAINERID for the field type in patch 4 ("audit: add containerid
filtering")

> > The "op" field indicates an initial set.  The "pid" to "ses" fields
> > are the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the
> > process being "contained".  Old and new container ID values are given
> > in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
> > 
> > It is not permitted to self-set, unset or re-set the container ID.  A
> > child inherits its parent's container ID, but then can be set only
> > once after.
> > 
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/32
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/proc/base.c             | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++
> >  include/linux/audit.h      | 16 +++++++++
> >  include/linux/init_task.h  |  4 ++-
> >  include/linux/sched.h      |  1 +
> >  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  2 ++
> >  kernel/auditsc.c           | 84
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 143
> > insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> > index 60316b5..6ce4fbe 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> > @@ -1299,6 +1299,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file
> > * file, char __user * buf, .read		= proc_sessionid_read,
> >  	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
> >  };
> > +
> > +static ssize_t proc_containerid_write(struct file *file, const char
> > __user *buf,
> > +				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > +	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> > +	u64 containerid;
> > +	int rv;
> > +	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
> > +
> > +	if (!task)
> > +		return -ESRCH;
> > +	if (*ppos != 0) {
> > +		/* No partial writes. */
> > +		put_task_struct(task);
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, &containerid);
> > +	if (rv < 0) {
> > +		put_task_struct(task);
> > +		return rv;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	rv = audit_set_containerid(task, containerid);
> > +	put_task_struct(task);
> > +	if (rv < 0)
> > +		return rv;
> > +	return count;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct file_operations proc_containerid_operations = {
> > +	.write		= proc_containerid_write,
> > +	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
> > +};
> > +
> >  #endif
> >  
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> > @@ -2961,6 +2996,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file
> > *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> >  	REG("loginuid",   S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
> >  	REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
> > +	REG("containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
> >  #endif
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> >  	REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR,
> > proc_fault_inject_operations), @@ -3355,6 +3391,7 @@ static int
> > proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) #ifdef
> > CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL REG("loginuid",  S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,
> > proc_loginuid_operations), REG("sessionid",  S_IRUGO,
> > proc_sessionid_operations),
> > +	REG("containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_containerid_operations),
> >  #endif
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> >  	REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR,
> > proc_fault_inject_operations), diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h
> > b/include/linux/audit.h index af410d9..fe4ba3f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> >  
> >  #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
> >  #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1)
> > +#define INVALID_CID AUDIT_CID_UNSET
> >  
> >  struct audit_sig_info {
> >  	uid_t		uid;
> > @@ -321,6 +322,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct
> > task_struct *t) extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
> > *ctx, struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial);
> >  extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid);
> > +extern int audit_set_containerid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64
> > containerid); 
> >  static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> >  {
> > @@ -332,6 +334,11 @@ static inline unsigned int
> > audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) return tsk->sessionid;
> >  }
> >  
> > +static inline u64 audit_get_containerid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > +	return tsk->containerid;
> > +}
> > +
> >  extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
> >  extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
> > gid_t gid, umode_t mode); extern void __audit_bprm(struct
> > linux_binprm *bprm); @@ -517,6 +524,10 @@ static inline unsigned int
> > audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) {
> >  	return -1;
> >  }
> > +static inline kuid_t audit_get_containerid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > +	return INVALID_CID;
> > +}
> >  static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> >  { }
> >  static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t
> > uid, @@ -581,6 +592,11 @@ static inline bool
> > audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) return
> > uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); }
> >  
> > +static inline bool audit_containerid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > +	return audit_get_containerid(tsk) != INVALID_CID;
> > +}
> > +
> >  static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const
> > char *buf) {
> >  	audit_log_n_string(ab, buf, strlen(buf));
> > diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
> > index 6a53262..046bd0a 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/init_task.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
> > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/sched/rt.h>
> >  #include <linux/livepatch.h>
> >  #include <linux/mm_types.h>
> > +#include <linux/audit.h>
> >  
> >  #include <asm/thread_info.h>
> >  
> > @@ -120,7 +121,8 @@
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> >  #define INIT_IDS \
> >  	.loginuid = INVALID_UID, \
> > -	.sessionid = (unsigned int)-1,
> > +	.sessionid = (unsigned int)-1, \
> > +	.containerid = INVALID_CID,
> >  #else
> >  #define INIT_IDS
> >  #endif
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> > index d258826..1b82191 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> > @@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ struct task_struct {
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> >  	kuid_t				loginuid;
> >  	unsigned int			sessionid;
> > +	u64				containerid;
> >  #endif
> >  	struct seccomp			seccomp;
> >  
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > index 4e61a9e..921a71f 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
> >  #define AUDIT_TTY_SET		1017	/* Set TTY auditing
> > status */ #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE	1018	/* Turn an
> > audit feature on or off */ #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE
> > 1019	/* Get which features are enabled */ +#define
> > AUDIT_CONTAINER		1020	/* Define the container id
> > and information */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG	1100	/*
> > Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define
> > AUDIT_USER_AVC		1107	/* We filter this
> > differently */ @@ -465,6 +466,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status { };
> >  
> >  #define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1
> > +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)
> >  
> >  /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
> >   * fields.  It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
> > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > index 4e0a4ac..29c8482 100644
> > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > @@ -2073,6 +2073,90 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> >  	return rc;
> >  }
> >  
> > +static int audit_set_containerid_perm(struct task_struct *task, u64
> > containerid) +{
> > +	struct task_struct *parent;
> > +	u64 pcontainerid, ccontainerid;
> > +
> > +	/* Don't allow to set our own containerid */
> > +	if (current == task)
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +	/* Don't allow the containerid to be unset */
> > +	if (!cid_valid(containerid))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	/* if we don't have caps, reject */
> > +	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +	/* if containerid is unset, allow */
> > +	if (!audit_containerid_set(task))
> > +		return 0;
> > +	/* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent,
> > reject */
> > +	ccontainerid = audit_get_containerid(task);
> > +	rcu_read_lock();
> > +	parent = rcu_dereference(task->real_parent);
> > +	rcu_read_unlock();
> > +	task_lock(parent);
> > +	pcontainerid = audit_get_containerid(parent);
> > +	task_unlock(parent);
> > +	if (ccontainerid != pcontainerid)
> > +		return -EPERM;
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void audit_log_set_containerid(struct task_struct *task, u64
> > oldcontainerid,
> > +				      u64 containerid, int rc)
> > +{
> > +	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> > +	uid_t uid;
> > +	struct tty_struct *tty;
> > +
> > +	if (!audit_enabled)
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER);
> > +	if (!ab)
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
> > +	tty = audit_get_tty(current);
> > +
> > +	audit_log_format(ab, "op=set pid=%d uid=%u",
> > task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
> > +	audit_log_task_context(ab);
> > +	audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u opid=%d
> > old-contid=%llu contid=%llu res=%d",
> 
> The preferred ordering would be: op, opid, old-contid, contid, pid, uid,
> tty, ses, subj, comm, exe, res. This groups the searchable fields
> together using the most common ordering so that parsing is simple.

There has been a suggestion to make this a syscall-connected record, and
if that is the case, we'd simply drop all the fields that would be
duplicated by the syscall record.  Otherwise, I'll use your suggested
order.

As you may recall this suggestion was also made for the AUDIT_LOGIN
record.

> Thanks,
> -Steve
> 
> > +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
> > audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> > +			 tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> > audit_get_sessionid(current),
> > +			 task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontainerid,
> > containerid, !rc); +
> > +	audit_put_tty(tty);
> > +	audit_log_end(ab);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * audit_set_containerid - set current task's audit_context
> > containerid
> > + * @containerid: containerid value
> > + *
> > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> > + *
> > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_containerid_write().
> > + */
> > +int audit_set_containerid(struct task_struct *task, u64 containerid)
> > +{
> > +	u64 oldcontainerid;
> > +	int rc;
> > +
> > +	oldcontainerid = audit_get_containerid(task);
> > +
> > +	rc = audit_set_containerid_perm(task, containerid);
> > +	if (!rc) {
> > +		task_lock(task);
> > +		task->containerid = containerid;
> > +		task_unlock(task);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	audit_log_set_containerid(task, oldcontainerid, containerid,
> > rc);
> > +	return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> >  /**
> >   * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
> >   * @oflag: open flag
> 

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635