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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a8-v6si14619786ple.222.2018.05.21.14.27.37; Mon, 21 May 2018 14:27:52 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=eFLyjKjl; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932762AbeEUV1a (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 21 May 2018 17:27:30 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:42158 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932739AbeEUV1V (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 May 2018 17:27:21 -0400 Received: from localhost (LFbn-1-12247-202.w90-92.abo.wanadoo.fr [90.92.61.202]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 097FD20875; Mon, 21 May 2018 21:27:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1526938040; bh=T9UbWBnHJk9reewUJoWthEeN1UXeEAkigJ+ufDsytKQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=eFLyjKjlNWPJod3hl3YFH/caMzV7goHDp3jjKXF6ovv9NBsCFyu0DI/hG0uyJG+B4 8bOogKpT4EAvDnOyUO/MVdkYUU7/g1UqYB+qbpqyZne1saUSGWdjRVoSBCGQdhveAR ci/C1nYCMFftQaMYdvMkkbYkf3qXTrkv+9pkERWc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Borislav Petkov , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Subject: [PATCH 4.16 097/110] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 23:12:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20180521210514.282653573@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180521210503.823249477@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180521210503.823249477@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Thomas Gleixner commit 52817587e706686fcdb27f14c1b000c92f266c96 upstream The SSBD enumeration is similarly to the other bits magically shared between Intel and AMD though the mechanisms are different. Make X86_FEATURE_SSBD synthetic and set it depending on the vendor specific features or family dependent setup. Change the Intel bit to X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD to denote that SSBD is controlled via MSR_SPEC_CTRL and fix up the usage sites. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 7 +++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 7 +------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -207,15 +207,14 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ - +#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ @@ -338,7 +337,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD (18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ /* * BUG word(s) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -570,8 +570,8 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_ * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD. */ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD); - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD); x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit; } } @@ -919,11 +919,6 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); - - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD); - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD); - } } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) return; - /* Intel controls SSB in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)) host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) @@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) return; - /* Intel controls SSB in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)) host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags); if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void) { u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask; - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval); } --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -767,6 +767,9 @@ static void init_speculation_control(str if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP)) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD); + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) { set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS); set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD); } /* --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculativ { u64 msr; - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) { msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn); wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr); } else {