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Subject: Re: [PATCH] audit: add containerid support for IMA-audit
To:     Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@redhat.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, paul@paul-moore.com
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From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 May 2018 17:57:29 -0400
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On 05/21/2018 02:30 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> Hello Stefan,
>
> On Monday, May 21, 2018 1:53:04 PM EDT Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 05/21/2018 12:58 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
>>> On Thursday, May 17, 2018 10:18:13 AM EDT Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>> audit_log_container_info() then releasing the local context.  This
>>>>> version of the record has additional concerns covered here:
>>>>> https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/52
>>>> Following the discussion there and the concern with breaking user space,
>>>> how can we split up the AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE that is used in
>>>> ima_audit_measurement() and ima_parse_rule(), without 'breaking user
>>>> space'?
>>>>
>>>> A message produced by ima_parse_rule() looks like this here:
>>>>
>>>> type=INTEGRITY_RULE msg=audit(1526566213.870:305): action="dont_measure"
>>>> fsmagic="0x9fa0" res=1
>>> Why is action and fsmagic being logged as untrusted strings? Untrusted
>>> strings are used when an unprivileged user can affect the contents of the
>>> field such as creating a file with space or special characters in the
>>> name.
>>>
>>> Also, subject and object information is missing. Who loaded this rule?
>>>
>>>> in contrast to that an INTEGRITY_PCR record type:
>>>>
>>>> type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1526566235.193:334): pid=1615 uid=0 auid=0
>>>> ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>>>> op="invalid_pcr" cause="open_writers" comm="scp"
>>>> name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="dm-0" ino=1962625 res=1
>>> Why is op & cause being logged as an untrusted string? This also has
>>> incomplete subject information.
>> It's calling audit_log_string() in both cases:
>>
>> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/security/integrity/integrity
>> _audit.c#L48
> I see. Looking things over, I see that it seems like it should do the right
> thing. But the original purpose for this function is here:
>
> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/audit.c#L1944
>
> This is where it is logging an untrusted string and has to decide to encode
> it or just place it in quotes. If it has quotes, that means it's an untrusted
> string but has no control characters in it. I think you want to use
> audit_log_format() for any string that is trustworthy.

Replacing all occurrences (in IMA) of audit_log_string() with 
audit_log_format().
>
>
> As an aside, I wonder why audit_log_string() is in the API when it is a
> helper to audit_log_untrustedstring() ?  Without understanding the rules of
> untrusted strings, it can't be used correctly without re-inventing
> audit_log_untrustedstring() by hand.
>
>
>>>> Should some of the fields from INTEGRITY_PCR also appear in
>>>> INTEGRITY_RULE? If so, which ones?
>>> pid, uid, auid, tty, session, subj, comm, exe, res.  <- these are
>>> required to be searchable
>>>
>>>> We could probably refactor the current  integrity_audit_message() and
>>>> have ima_parse_rule() call into it to get those fields as well. I
>>>> suppose adding new fields to it wouldn't be considered breaking user
>>>> space?
>>> The audit user space utilities pretty much expects those fields in that
>>> order for any IMA originating events. You can add things like op or
>>> cause before
>> We will call into audit_log_task, which will put the parameters into
>> correct order:
>>
>> auid uid gid ses subj pid comm exe
> I'm telling you what the correct order is.  :-)  A long time ago, the IMA

:-) Thanks. Was getting confused.

> system had audit events with the order I'm mentioning. For example, here's
> one from a log I collected back in 2013:
>
> type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1327409021.813:21): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295
> ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op="add_template_measure" cause="hash_added"
> comm="init" name="01parse-kernel.sh" dev=rootfs ino=5413 res=0
>
> it was missing "tty" and "exe", but the order is as I mentioned. The
> expectation is that INTEGRITY events maintain this established order across
> all events.

I am *appending* exe= and tty= now:

type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1526939047.809:305): pid=1609 uid=0 auid=0 
ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 
op="invalid_pcr" cause="open_writers" comm="ssh" 
name="/var/lib/sss/mc/passwd" dev="dm-0" ino=1962679 res=1 
exe="/usr/bin/ssh" tty=tty2


    Stefan


>
> Thanks,
> -Steve
>
>
>> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/auditsc.c#L2433
>>
>>> that. The reason why you can do that is those additional fields are not
>>> required to be searchable by common criteria.
>>>
>>> -Steve
>
>
>