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Date:   Thu, 24 May 2018 17:57:37 +0200
From:   Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc:     Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH 5/6] capabilities: Allow privileged user in
 s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs
Message-ID: <20180524155737.GA19932@mailbox.org>
References: <87o9h6554f.fsf@xmission.com>
 <20180523232538.4880-5-ebiederm@xmission.com>
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On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 06:25:37PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
> manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
> the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
> handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
> sense for commoncap to prevent writing these xattrs to the
> filesystem. The capability and LSM code have already been updated
> to appropriately handle xattrs from unprivileged mounts, so it
> is safe to loosen this restriction on setting xattrs.
> 
> The exception to this logic is that writing xattrs to a mounted
> filesystem may also cause the LSM inode_post_setxattr or
> inode_setsecurity callbacks to be invoked. SELinux will deny the
> xattr update by virtue of applying mountpoint labeling to
> unprivileged userns mounts, and Smack will deny the writes for
> any user without global CAP_MAC_ADMIN, so loosening the
> capability check in commoncap is safe in this respect as well.

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>

> 
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Note, I just talked to Serge. This should be Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> ---
>  security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++++--
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 1ce701fcb3f3..f4c33abd9959 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -919,6 +919,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>  		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
>  {
> +	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
> +
>  	/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
>  	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>  			sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
> @@ -931,7 +933,7 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>  	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -949,6 +951,8 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>   */
>  int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  {
> +	struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
> +
>  	/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
>  	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
>  			sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
> @@ -964,7 +968,7 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	return 0;
>  }
> -- 
> 2.14.1
>