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Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 19/32] VFS: Implement fsopen() to prepare for a mount [ver #8] From: David Howells To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 01:07:27 +0100 Message-ID: <152720684753.9073.7743237635311367354.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <152720672288.9073.9868393448836301272.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <152720672288.9073.9868393448836301272.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.3 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.6]); Fri, 25 May 2018 00:07:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.6]); Fri, 25 May 2018 00:07:28 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.3' DOMAIN:'int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'dhowells@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Provide an fsopen() system call that starts the process of preparing to mount, using an fd as a context handle. fsopen() is given the name of the filesystem that will be used: int mfd = fsopen(const char *fsname, int open_flags, void *reserved3, void *reserved4, void *reserved5); where open_flags can be 0 or O_CLOEXEC and reserved* should all be NULL for the moment. For example: mfd = fsopen("ext4", O_CLOEXEC, NULL, NULL, NULL); write(mfd, "s /dev/sdb1"); // note I'm ignoring write's length arg write(mfd, "o noatime"); write(mfd, "o acl"); write(mfd, "o user_attr"); write(mfd, "o iversion"); write(mfd, "o "); write(mfd, "r /my/container"); // root inside the fs write(mfd, "x create"); // create the superblock fsmount(mfd, container_fd, "/mnt", AT_NO_FOLLOW); mfd = fsopen("afs", -1); write(mfd, "s %grand.central.org:root.cell"); write(mfd, "o cell=grand.central.org"); write(mfd, "r /"); write(mfd, "x create"); fsmount(mfd, AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0); If an error is reported at any step, an error message may be available to be read() back (ENODATA will be reported if there isn't an error available) in the form: "e :" "e SELinux:Mount on mountpoint not permitted" Once fsmount() has been called, further write() calls will incur EBUSY, even if the fsmount() fails. read() is still possible to retrieve error information. The fsopen() syscall creates a mount context and hangs it of the fd that it returns. Netlink is not used because it is optional. Note that, for the moment, the caller must have SYS_CAP_ADMIN to use fsopen(). Signed-off-by: David Howells --- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 fs/Makefile | 2 fs/fsopen.c | 352 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 7 files changed, 361 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 fs/fsopen.c diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl index 14a2f996e543..0e084cc11638 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl @@ -397,3 +397,4 @@ 383 i386 statx sys_statx __ia32_sys_statx 384 i386 arch_prctl sys_arch_prctl __ia32_compat_sys_arch_prctl 385 i386 io_pgetevents sys_io_pgetevents __ia32_compat_sys_io_pgetevents +386 i386 fsopen sys_fsopen __ia32_sys_fsopen diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl index cd36232ab62f..7200d5bb65ca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ 331 common pkey_free __x64_sys_pkey_free 332 common statx __x64_sys_statx 333 common io_pgetevents __x64_sys_io_pgetevents +334 common fsopen __x64_sys_fsopen # # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile index 6f2dae3c32da..ee3c8b31cc58 100644 --- a/fs/Makefile +++ b/fs/Makefile @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \ seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \ pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \ stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \ - fs_context.o + fs_context.o fsopen.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y) obj-y += buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..26565ddd7c9e --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/fsopen.c @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/* Filesystem access-by-fd. + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "mount.h" + +static struct vfsmount *fscontext_fs_mnt __read_mostly; + +static int fscontext_fs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct fs_context *fc = file->private_data; + + file->private_data = NULL; + + put_fs_context(fc); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Userspace writes configuration data and commands to the fd and we parse it + * here. For the moment, we assume a single option or command per write. Each + * line written is of the form + * + * + * + * d /dev/sda1 -- Device name + * o noatime -- Option without value + * o cell=grand.central.org -- Option with value + * r / -- Dir within device to mount + * x create -- Create a superblock + * x reconfigure -- Reconfigure a superblock + */ +static ssize_t fscontext_fs_write(struct file *file, + const char __user *_buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct fs_context *fc = file->private_data; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + char opt[2], *data; + ssize_t ret; + + if (len < 3 || len > 4095) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(opt, _buf, 2) != 0) + return -EFAULT; + switch (opt[0]) { + case 's': + case 'o': + case 'x': + break; + default: + goto err_bad_cmd; + } + if (opt[1] != ' ') + goto err_bad_cmd; + + data = memdup_user_nul(_buf + 2, len - 2); + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return PTR_ERR(data); + + /* From this point onwards we need to lock the fd against someone + * trying to mount it. + */ + ret = inode_lock_killable(inode); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_free; + + if (fc->phase == FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_RECONF) { + if (fc->fs_type->init_fs_context) { + ret = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc, fc->root); + if (ret < 0) { + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED; + goto err_unlock; + } + } else { + /* Leave legacy context ops in place */ + } + + /* Do the security check last because ->init_fs_context may + * change the namespace subscriptions. + */ + ret = security_fs_context_alloc(fc, fc->root); + if (ret < 0) { + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED; + goto err_unlock; + } + + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS; + } + + ret = -EINVAL; + switch (opt[0]) { + case 's': + if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS && + fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS) + goto wrong_phase; + ret = vfs_set_fs_source(fc, data, len - 2); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_unlock; + data = NULL; + break; + + case 'o': + if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS && + fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_RECONF_PARAMS) + goto wrong_phase; + ret = vfs_parse_fs_option(fc, data, len - 2); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_unlock; + break; + + case 'x': + if (strcmp(data, "create") == 0) { + if (fc->phase != FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS) + goto wrong_phase; + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATING; + ret = vfs_get_tree(fc); + if (ret == 0) + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_MOUNT; + else + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_FAILED; + } else { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + if (ret < 0) + goto err_unlock; + break; + + default: + goto err_unlock; + } + + ret = len; +err_unlock: + inode_unlock(inode); +err_free: + kfree(data); + return ret; +err_bad_cmd: + return -EINVAL; +wrong_phase: + ret = -EBUSY; + goto err_unlock; +} + +const struct file_operations fscontext_fs_fops = { + .write = fscontext_fs_write, + .release = fscontext_fs_release, + .llseek = no_llseek, +}; + +/* + * Indicate the name we want to display the filesystem file as. + */ +static char *fscontext_fs_dname(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, int buflen) +{ + return dynamic_dname(dentry, buffer, buflen, "fs:[%lu]", + d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); +} + +static const struct dentry_operations fscontext_fs_dentry_operations = { + .d_dname = fscontext_fs_dname, +}; + +/* + * Create a file that can be used to configure a new mount. + */ +static struct file *create_fscontext_file(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct inode *inode; + struct file *f; + struct path path; + int ret; + + inode = alloc_anon_inode(fscontext_fs_mnt->mnt_sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return ERR_CAST(inode); + inode->i_fop = &fscontext_fs_fops; + + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + path.dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(fscontext_fs_mnt->mnt_sb, &empty_name); + if (!path.dentry) + goto err_inode; + path.mnt = mntget(fscontext_fs_mnt); + + d_instantiate(path.dentry, inode); + + f = alloc_file(&path, FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE, &fscontext_fs_fops); + if (IS_ERR(f)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(f); + goto err_file; + } + + f->private_data = fc; + return f; + +err_file: + path_put(&path); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + +err_inode: + iput(inode); + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +static const struct super_operations fscontext_fs_super_ops = { + .drop_inode = generic_delete_inode, + .destroy_inode = free_inode_nonrcu, + .statfs = simple_statfs, +}; + +/* + * Finish filling in the superblock and allocate the root dentry. + */ +static int fscontext_fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, + struct fs_context *fc) +{ + struct dentry *root; + struct inode *inode; + + sb->s_op = &fscontext_fs_super_ops; + inode = alloc_anon_inode(sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return PTR_ERR(inode); + inode->i_fop = &fscontext_fs_fops; + + root = d_make_root(inode); + if (!root) + return -ENOMEM; /* inode is put by d_make_root() */ + sb->s_root = root; + return 0; +} + +static int fscontext_fs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc) +{ + return vfs_get_super(fc, vfs_get_single_super, fscontext_fs_fill_super); +} + +static const struct fs_context_operations fscontext_fs_context_ops = { + .get_tree = fscontext_fs_get_tree, +}; + +static int fs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference) +{ + fc->ops = &fscontext_fs_context_ops; + return 0; +} + +static struct file_system_type fscontext_fs_type = { + .name = "fscontext", + .init_fs_context = fs_init_fs_context, + .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, +}; + +static int __init init_fscontext_fs(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = register_filesystem(&fscontext_fs_type); + if (ret < 0) + panic("Cannot register fscontext_fs\n"); + + fscontext_fs_mnt = kern_mount(&fscontext_fs_type); + if (IS_ERR(fscontext_fs_mnt)) + panic("Cannot mount fscontext_fs: %ld\n", + PTR_ERR(fscontext_fs_mnt)); + return 0; +} + +fs_initcall(init_fscontext_fs); + +/* + * Open a filesystem by name so that it can be configured for mounting. + * + * We are allowed to specify a container in which the filesystem will be + * opened, thereby indicating which namespaces will be used (notably, which + * network namespace will be used for network filesystems). + */ +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fsopen, const char __user *, _fs_name, unsigned int, flags, + void *, reserved3, void *, reserved4, void *, reserved5) +{ + struct file_system_type *fs_type; + struct fs_context *fc; + struct file *file; + const char *fs_name; + int fd, ret; + + if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (flags & ~O_CLOEXEC || reserved3 || reserved4 || reserved5) + return -EINVAL; + + fs_name = strndup_user(_fs_name, PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(fs_name)) + return PTR_ERR(fs_name); + + fs_type = get_fs_type(fs_name); + kfree(fs_name); + if (!fs_type) + return -ENODEV; + + fc = vfs_new_fs_context(fs_type, NULL, 0, FS_CONTEXT_FOR_USER_MOUNT); + put_filesystem(fs_type); + if (IS_ERR(fc)) + return PTR_ERR(fc); + + fc->phase = FS_CONTEXT_CREATE_PARAMS; + + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!fc->ops) + goto err_fc; + + file = create_fscontext_file(fc); + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(file); + goto err_fc; + } + + ret = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & O_CLOEXEC); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_file; + + fd = ret; + fd_install(fd, file); + return fd; + +err_file: + fput(file); + return ret; + +err_fc: + put_fs_context(fc); + return ret; +} diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index 811172fcb916..e0f19406af92 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -896,6 +896,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val); asmlinkage long sys_pkey_free(int pkey); asmlinkage long sys_statx(int dfd, const char __user *path, unsigned flags, unsigned mask, struct statx __user *buffer); +asmlinkage long sys_fsopen(const char *fs_name, unsigned int flags, + void *reserved3, void *reserved4, void *reserved5); /* diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h index 1a6fee974116..2fe02277fb32 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h @@ -89,5 +89,6 @@ #define UDF_SUPER_MAGIC 0x15013346 #define BALLOON_KVM_MAGIC 0x13661366 #define ZSMALLOC_MAGIC 0x58295829 +#define FSCONTEXT_FS_MAGIC 0x66736673 #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 183169c2a75b..6bb0e1bb3eae 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -432,3 +432,6 @@ COND_SYSCALL(setresgid16); COND_SYSCALL(setresuid16); COND_SYSCALL(setreuid16); COND_SYSCALL(setuid16); + +/* fd-based mount */ +COND_SYSCALL(sys_fsopen);