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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id j15-v6si7524568pga.252.2018.05.28.03.52.34; Mon, 28 May 2018 03:52:49 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=fwWFa5rp; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1163803AbeE1KvV (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 28 May 2018 06:51:21 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:40746 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1163763AbeE1KvQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 May 2018 06:51:16 -0400 Received: from localhost (LFbn-1-12247-202.w90-92.abo.wanadoo.fr [90.92.61.202]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E058820660; Mon, 28 May 2018 10:51:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1527504676; bh=gzEeoIwKIzcYvjuKsJqXVqOd0zbgbqStGIcn/rFGmH4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fwWFa5rpbUGtpMiwYpHRBgy7rH4559PNhyHMkywdTW/GmnMubEpHA/bLTKhUIalK1 5083GAWkjPEEgk2QadnJLtTh26Xnk0gNtFWa0fCjo13GC6gjHsIBi1cflEEUlby+CW QrgyDQoTbiX0s4MFoZBLezXxlJaLEJpdxWpSV100= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Peter Malone , Mathieu Malaterre , Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 225/496] fbdev: Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper(). Date: Mon, 28 May 2018 12:00:10 +0200 Message-Id: <20180528100329.395969027@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180528100319.498712256@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180528100319.498712256@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Peter Malone [ Upstream commit 250c6c49e3b68756b14983c076183568636e2bde ] Fixing arbitrary kernel leak in case FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC in sbusfb_ioctl_helper(). 'index' is defined as an int in sbusfb_ioctl_helper(). We retrieve this from the user: if (get_user(index, &c->index) || __get_user(count, &c->count) || __get_user(ured, &c->red) || __get_user(ugreen, &c->green) || __get_user(ublue, &c->blue)) return -EFAULT; and then we use 'index' in the following way: red = cmap->red[index + i] >> 8; green = cmap->green[index + i] >> 8; blue = cmap->blue[index + i] >> 8; This is a classic information leak vulnerability. 'index' should be an unsigned int, given its usage above. This patch is straight-forward; it changes 'index' to unsigned int in two switch-cases: FBIOGETCMAP_SPARC && FBIOPUTCMAP_SPARC. This patch fixes CVE-2018-6412. Signed-off-by: Peter Malone Acked-by: Mathieu Malaterre Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/sbuslib.c @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cm unsigned char __user *ured; unsigned char __user *ugreen; unsigned char __user *ublue; - int index, count, i; + unsigned int index, count, i; if (get_user(index, &c->index) || __get_user(count, &c->count) || @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int sbusfb_ioctl_helper(unsigned long cm unsigned char __user *ugreen; unsigned char __user *ublue; struct fb_cmap *cmap = &info->cmap; - int index, count, i; + unsigned int index, count, i; u8 red, green, blue; if (get_user(index, &c->index) ||