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R. Silva" , Andrew Morton , Alexei Starovoitov , Dan Williams , Thomas Gleixner , Peter Zijlstra , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 4.16 037/272] kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue Date: Mon, 28 May 2018 12:01:10 +0200 Message-Id: <20180528100243.876338234@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180528100240.256525891@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180528100240.256525891@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 23d6aef74da86a33fa6bb75f79565e0a16ee97c2 upstream. `resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index current->signal->rlim Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/sys.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1401,6 +1401,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; + resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); task_lock(current->group_leader); x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader); @@ -1420,6 +1421,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, un if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; + resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); task_lock(current->group_leader); r = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader);