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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 29 May 2018 19:02:21 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w4TI2KMi19791998 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 29 May 2018 18:02:20 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27A91AE057; Tue, 29 May 2018 18:51:27 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3B06AE053; Tue, 29 May 2018 18:51:25 +0100 (BST) Received: from dhcp-9-2-54-219.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.54.219]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 29 May 2018 18:51:25 +0100 (BST) From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Eric Biederman , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ard Biesheuvel , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Matthew Garrett Subject: [PATCH v4 5/8] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 14:01:57 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18052918-0044-0000-0000-00000558109F X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18052918-0045-0000-0000-0000289A201D Message-Id: <1527616920-5415-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-05-29_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=5 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1805290195 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Luis, is the security_kernel_post_read_file LSM hook in firmware_loading_store() still needed after this patch? Should it be calling security_kernel_load_data() instead? --- With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez Cc: David Howells Cc: Matthew Garrett --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a565d46084c2..4a87f78098c8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -475,8 +475,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } return 0; } @@ -520,6 +522,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } + break; + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) { + pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } default: break; } -- 2.7.5