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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 30 May 2018 00:25:05 +0100 Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.59]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w4TNP43p15728712 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 29 May 2018 23:25:04 GMT Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0DFBA404D; Wed, 30 May 2018 00:16:16 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B088A4040; Wed, 30 May 2018 00:16:15 +0100 (BST) Received: from dhcp-9-2-54-219.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.54.219]) by d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 30 May 2018 00:16:14 +0100 (BST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 8/8] module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module From: Mimi Zohar To: Paul Moore , Kees Cook Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Eric Biederman , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeff Vander Stoep , Casey Schaufler Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 19:25:02 -0400 In-Reply-To: References: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1527616920-5415-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18052923-0012-0000-0000-000005DBD40D X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18052923-0013-0000-0000-0000195939B9 Message-Id: <1527636302.3534.46.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-05-29_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1805220000 definitions=main-1805290249 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Kees, Missing from this patch are the loadpin changes.  Before including them in the next version of this patch, do you prefer separating the init_module from the finit_module support in loadpin_read_file() or keeping it as one function, like Paul for SELinux? Mimi On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 18:39 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 2:02 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly > > or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch > > replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new > > security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in > > SELinux and IMA. > > > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar > > Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep > > Cc: Paul Moore > > Cc: Casey Schaufler > > --- > > kernel/module.c | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ > > 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c > > index ce8066b88178..b97c642b5b4d 100644 > > --- a/kernel/module.c > > +++ b/kernel/module.c > > @@ -2879,7 +2879,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, > > if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) > > return -ENOEXEC; > > > > - err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); > > + err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE); > > if (err) > > return err; > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > index 3dae605a1604..0ff1d8152f6e 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > @@ -441,17 +441,6 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > > */ > > int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > > { > > - bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); > > - > > - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { > > - if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && > > - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > > - pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); > > - return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > > - } > > - return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ > > - } > > - > > if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { > > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && > > (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > > @@ -490,9 +479,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > > return 0; > > } > > > > - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ > > - return 0; > > - > > /* permit signed certs */ > > if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) > > return 0; > > @@ -521,6 +507,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > > */ > > int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > > { > > + bool sig_enforce; > > + > > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) > > return 0; > > > > @@ -536,6 +524,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > > pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); > > return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > > } > > + break; > > + case LOADING_MODULE: > > + sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); > > + > > + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { > > + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); > > + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > > + } > > default: > > break; > > } > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > > index 02ebd1585eaf..e02186470fc5 100644 > > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > > @@ -4018,12 +4018,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) > > u32 sid = current_sid(); > > int rc; > > > > - /* init_module */ > > - if (file == NULL) > > - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > > - sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, > > - SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); > > - > > /* finit_module */ > > > > ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; > > @@ -4043,6 +4037,25 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) > > SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); > > } > > > > +static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > > +{ > > + u32 sid; > > + int rc = 0; > > + > > + switch (id) { > > + case LOADING_MODULE: > > + sid = current_sid(); > > + > > + /* init_module */ > > + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, > > + SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); > > + default: > > + break; > > + } > > + > > + return rc; > > +} > > I'm not a fan of the duplication here. If we must have a new LSM hook > for this, can we at least have it call > selinux_kernel_module_from_file() so we have all the kernel module > loading logic/controls in one function? Yes, I understand there are > differences between init_module() and finit_module() but I like > handling them both in one function as we do today. > > > static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, > > enum kernel_read_file_id id) > > { > > @@ -6950,6 +6963,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), > > -- > > 2.7.5 > > >