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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id z80-v6si38018430pfi.7.2018.05.31.11.02.06; Thu, 31 May 2018 11:02:21 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932820AbeEaSAF (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 31 May 2018 14:00:05 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:18552 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755990AbeEaR7G (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 May 2018 13:59:06 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga001.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.18]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 31 May 2018 10:58:59 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.49,463,1520924400"; d="scan'208";a="60725543" Received: from chang-linux-2.sc.intel.com ([10.3.52.139]) by orsmga001.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 31 May 2018 10:58:59 -0700 From: "Chang S. Bae" To: Andy Lutomirski , "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar Cc: Andi Kleen , Dave Hansen , Markus T Metzger , "Ravi V . Shankar" , "Chang S . Bae" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V2 13/15] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE by default and add a chicken bit Date: Thu, 31 May 2018 10:58:43 -0700 Message-Id: <1527789525-8857-14-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1527789525-8857-1-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> References: <1527789525-8857-1-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Andy Lutomirski Now that FSGSBASE is fully supported, remove unsafe_fsgsbase, enable FSGSBASE by default, and add nofsgsbase to disable it. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 ++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index b92c4a0..a62eeb3 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2600,8 +2600,7 @@ emulation library even if a 387 maths coprocessor is present. - unsafe_fsgsbase [X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions. This will be - replaced with a nofsgsbase flag. + nofsgsbase [X86] Disables FSGSBASE instructions. no_console_suspend [HW] Never suspend the console diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 5412d62..0339bb3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -355,23 +355,21 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP); } -/* - * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are updated. - * This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally. Setting - * unsafe_fsgsbase will allow the series to be bisected if necessary. - * - * Once all the pieces are in place, this will go away and be replaced with - * a nofsgsbase chicken flag. - */ -static bool unsafe_fsgsbase; - -static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg) +static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg) { - unsafe_fsgsbase = true; - add_taint(TAINT_INSECURE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */ + if (strlen(arg)) + return 0; + + /* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) + return 1; + + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE); + pr_info("nofsgsbase: FSGSBASE disabled\n"); return 1; } -__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase); +__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup); /* * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode. @@ -1305,12 +1303,8 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_umip(c); /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */ - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) { - if (unsafe_fsgsbase) - cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE); - else - clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE); - } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE); /* * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features. -- 2.7.4