Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Date:   Mon, 4 Jun 2018 14:32:15 -0500
From:   "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy
 requiring signatures
Message-ID: <20180604193215.GA13553@mail.hallyn.com>
References: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
 <1528121025.3237.116.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
In-Reply-To: <1528121025.3237.116.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Instead of adding the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook - or defining a
> > wrapper for security_kernel_read_file LSM hook and adding it, or
> > renaming the existing hook to security_kernel_read_data() and adding it
> > - in places where the kernel isn't reading a file, this version of the
> > patch set defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data().
> > 
> > The new LSM hook does not replace the existing security_kernel_read_file
> > LSM hook, which is still needed, but defines a new LSM hook allowing
> > LSMs and IMA-appraisal the opportunity to fail loading userspace
> > provided file/data.
> > 
> > The only difference between the two LSM hooks is the LSM hook name and a
> > file descriptor.  Whether this is cause enough for requiring a new LSM
> > hook, is left to the security community.
> 
> Paul does not have a preference as to adding a new LSM hook or calling
> the existing hook. ?Either way is fine, as long as both the new and
> existing hooks call the existing function.
> 
> Casey didn't like the idea of a wrapper.
> James suggested renaming the LSM hook.
> 
> The maintainers for the callers of the LSM hook prefer a meaningful
> LSM hook name. ?The "null" argument is not as much of a concern. ?Only
> Eric seems to be asking for a separate, new LSM hook, without the
> "null" argument.
> 
> Unless someone really objects, to accommodate Eric we'll define a new
> LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data. ?Eric, are you planning on

I'm confused - isn't that what this patchset did? :)

> Ack'ing patches 1 & 2?
> 
> Mimi