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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy
 requiring signatures
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Date:   Mon, 04 Jun 2018 15:53:40 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20180604193215.GA13553@mail.hallyn.com>
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         <1528121025.3237.116.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
         <20180604193215.GA13553@mail.hallyn.com>
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On Mon, 2018-06-04 at 14:32 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> > On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > Instead of adding the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook - or defining a
> > > wrapper for security_kernel_read_file LSM hook and adding it, or
> > > renaming the existing hook to security_kernel_read_data() and adding it
> > > - in places where the kernel isn't reading a file, this version of the
> > > patch set defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data().
> > > 
> > > The new LSM hook does not replace the existing security_kernel_read_file
> > > LSM hook, which is still needed, but defines a new LSM hook allowing
> > > LSMs and IMA-appraisal the opportunity to fail loading userspace
> > > provided file/data.
> > > 
> > > The only difference between the two LSM hooks is the LSM hook name and a
> > > file descriptor.  Whether this is cause enough for requiring a new LSM
> > > hook, is left to the security community.
> > 
> > Paul does not have a preference as to adding a new LSM hook or calling
> > the existing hook.  Either way is fine, as long as both the new and
> > existing hooks call the existing function.
> > 
> > Casey didn't like the idea of a wrapper.
> > James suggested renaming the LSM hook.
> > 
> > The maintainers for the callers of the LSM hook prefer a meaningful
> > LSM hook name.  The "null" argument is not as much of a concern.  Only
> > Eric seems to be asking for a separate, new LSM hook, without the
> > "null" argument.
> > 
> > Unless someone really objects, to accommodate Eric we'll define a new
> > LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data.  Eric, are you planning on
> 
> I'm confused - isn't that what this patchset did? :)

Right.  I'm trying to get consensus whether it is needed.

> 
> > Ack'ing patches 1 & 2?
> > 
> > Mimi
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