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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date:   Tue, 5 Jun 2018 06:43:31 -0700
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy
 requiring signatures
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Kexec Mailing List <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
        Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 6:25 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> Quoting Kees Cook (keescook@chromium.org):
>> On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 9:09 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
>> > Personally I agree with Eric and prefer a new hook.  I don't feel strongly
>> > enough about it to keep bikeshedding, but since this set already exists,
>> > it seems like the way to go.
>>
>> And the new hook is "load stuff without a file descriptor"?
>
> Yes.  Load stuff based on my own credentials not those attached
> to a file.

Okay, I can live with that. :)

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security