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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x69-v6si19462684pfa.108.2018.06.06.12.07.44; Wed, 06 Jun 2018 12:07:58 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933772AbeFFR4p (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 6 Jun 2018 13:56:45 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:59352 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933729AbeFFR4n (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jun 2018 13:56:43 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F40E81109; Wed, 6 Jun 2018 17:56:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from x2.localnet (ovpn-121-235.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.121.235]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A6895C8B2; Wed, 6 Jun 2018 17:56:30 +0000 (UTC) From: Steve Grubb To: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , cgroups@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, luto@kernel.org, jlayton@redhat.com, carlos@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, simo@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, serge@hallyn.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 01/10] audit: add container id Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2018 13:56:25 -0400 Message-ID: <1828967.ZGm5HJUlmN@x2> Organization: Red Hat In-Reply-To: <0377c3ced6bdbc44fe17f9a5679cb6eda4304024.1528304203.git.rgb@redhat.com> References: <0377c3ced6bdbc44fe17f9a5679cb6eda4304024.1528304203.git.rgb@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.28]); Wed, 06 Jun 2018 17:56:43 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wednesday, June 6, 2018 12:58:28 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a > process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record to document the event. > > This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of > the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the > newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or > an additional task added to a container. > > The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615). > > The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. > > This will produce a record such as this: > type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set > opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root > uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash > exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes > > The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are > the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process > being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are > given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success. > > It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can > be set only once after. > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90 > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51 > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > See: > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ > kernel/auditsc.c | 71 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 135 > insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index eafa39a..318dff4 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -1302,6 +1302,41 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * > file, char __user * buf, .read = proc_sessionid_read, > .llseek = generic_file_llseek, > }; > + > +static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user > *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); > + u64 contid; > + int rv; > + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); > + > + if (!task) > + return -ESRCH; > + if (*ppos != 0) { > + /* No partial writes. */ > + put_task_struct(task); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, &contid); > + if (rv < 0) { > + put_task_struct(task); > + return rv; > + } > + > + rv = audit_set_contid(task, contid); > + put_task_struct(task); > + if (rv < 0) > + return rv; > + return count; > +} > + > +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { > + .write = proc_contid_write, > + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, > +}; > + > #endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION > @@ -2995,6 +3030,7 @@ static int proc_pid_patch_state(struct seq_file *m, > struct pid_namespace *ns, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations), > REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), > + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations), > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION > REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations), > @@ -3386,6 +3422,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode > *inode, int mask) #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations), > REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), > + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations), > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION > REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations), > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index 4f824c4..497cd81 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -219,6 +219,8 @@ static inline void audit_log_task_info(struct > audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_task_info { > kuid_t loginuid; > unsigned int sessionid; > + u64 contid; > + bool inherited; /* containerid inheritance */ > struct audit_context *ctx; > }; > extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit; > @@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, > struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial); > extern int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid); > +extern int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 contid); > > static inline kuid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > @@ -348,6 +351,14 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct > task_struct *tsk) return AUDIT_SID_UNSET; > } > > +static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + if (!tsk->audit) > + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > + else > + return tsk->audit->contid; > +} > + > extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp); > extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t > gid, umode_t mode); extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm); > @@ -542,6 +553,10 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct > task_struct *tsk) { > return AUDIT_SID_UNSET; > } > +static inline kuid_t audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > +} > static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) > { } > static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, > @@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct > task_struct *tsk) return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); > } > > +static inline bool cid_valid(u64 contid) > +{ > + return contid != AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > +} > + > +static inline bool audit_contid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + return cid_valid(audit_get_contid(tsk)); > +} > + > static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char > *buf) { > audit_log_n_string(ab, buf, strlen(buf)); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > index 04f9bd2..c3b1aca 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ > #define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */ > #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */ > #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */ > +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID 1020 /* Define the container id and information > */ > > #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly > uninteresting to kernel */ #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this > differently */ > @@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status { > > #define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1 > #define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1) > +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1) > > /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string > * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 59ef7a81..611e926 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) > return -ENOMEM; > info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); > + info->contid = audit_get_contid(current); > + info->inherited = true; > tsk->audit = info; > > if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) > @@ -985,6 +987,8 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) > struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { > .loginuid = INVALID_UID, > .sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET, > + .contid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET, > + .inherited = true, > .ctx = NULL, > }; > > @@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) > } > > /** > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid > + * @contid: contid value > + * > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. > + * > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). > + */ > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > +{ > + u64 oldcontid; > + int rc = 0; > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > + uid_t uid; > + struct tty_struct *tty; > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > + > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > + if (!task->audit) > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task); > + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ > + if (!cid_valid(contid)) > + rc = -EINVAL; > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */ > + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > + rc = -EPERM; > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ > + else if (!list_empty(&task->children)) > + rc = -EBUSY; > + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > + rc = -EALREADY; > + /* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ > + else if (cid_valid(oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) > + rc = -EEXIST; > + if (!rc) { > + task_lock(task); > + task->audit->contid = contid; > + task->audit->inherited = false; > + task_unlock(task); > + } > + > + if (!audit_enabled) > + return rc; > + > + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID); > + if (!ab) > + return rc; > + > + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); > + tty = audit_get_tty(current); > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d > uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontid, contid, > + task_tgid_nr(current), uid > + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), > + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", > + audit_get_sessionid(current)); The event code doesn't match the example event at the top. (uid and auid are transposed.) But the code looks right. Ack for the event format. -Steve > + audit_put_tty(tty); > + audit_log_task_context(ab); > + audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); > + audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); > + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !rc); > + audit_log_end(ab); > + return rc; > +} > + > +/** > * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open > * @oflag: open flag > * @mode: mode bits