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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r189-v6si13551892pgr.500.2018.06.07.07.40.50; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 07:41:04 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934267AbeFGOiz (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 7 Jun 2018 10:38:55 -0400 Received: from shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk ([88.96.1.126]:40486 "EHLO shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933655AbeFGOiy (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jun 2018 10:38:54 -0400 Received: from [148.252.241.226] (helo=deadeye) by shadbolt.decadent.org.uk with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1fQvbg-0005a0-Cq; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 15:09:40 +0100 Received: from ben by deadeye with local (Exim 4.91) (envelope-from ) id 1fQvb6-00031a-F4; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 15:09:04 +0100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, "Linus Torvalds" , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , "Mikulas Patocka" , "Eric Biggers" , "Willy Tarreau" , "Alexander Viro" , "Joe Lawrence" , "Michael Kerrisk" , "Kees Cook" Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2018 15:05:21 +0100 Message-ID: X-Mailer: LinuxStableQueue (scripts by bwh) Subject: [PATCH 3.16 212/410] pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits In-Reply-To: X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 148.252.241.226 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ben@decadent.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on shadbolt.decadent.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.57-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers commit 85c2dd5473b2718b4b63e74bfeb1ca876868e11f upstream. pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt and the pipe(7) man page. However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore, if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set, the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each. Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Joe Lawrence Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Mikulas Patocka Cc: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c @@ -601,6 +601,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; } +static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +{ + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) { struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; @@ -617,12 +622,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info( user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs); - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; } - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs)) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct; pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -1053,7 +1058,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers && (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + is_unprivileged_user()) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_revert_acct; }