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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b14-v6si7133485pls.292.2018.06.14.22.14.30; Thu, 14 Jun 2018 22:15:15 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755838AbeFOFJ2 (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 15 Jun 2018 01:09:28 -0400 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:33117 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755754AbeFOFIn (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Jun 2018 01:08:43 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 14 Jun 2018 22:08:42 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,225,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="47272196" Received: from devel-ww.sh.intel.com ([10.239.48.110]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 14 Jun 2018 22:08:40 -0700 From: Wei Wang To: virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, mst@redhat.com, mhocko@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, wei.w.wang@intel.com, liliang.opensource@gmail.com, yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com, quan.xu0@gmail.com, nilal@redhat.com, riel@redhat.com, peterx@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v33 3/4] mm/page_poison: expose page_poisoning_enabled to kernel modules Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:43:12 +0800 Message-Id: <1529037793-35521-4-git-send-email-wei.w.wang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1529037793-35521-1-git-send-email-wei.w.wang@intel.com> References: <1529037793-35521-1-git-send-email-wei.w.wang@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In some usages, e.g. virtio-balloon, a kernel module needs to know if page poisoning is in use. This patch exposes the page_poisoning_enabled function to kernel modules. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/page_poison.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/page_poison.c b/mm/page_poison.c index aa2b3d3..830f604 100644 --- a/mm/page_poison.c +++ b/mm/page_poison.c @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ static int __init early_page_poison_param(char *buf) } early_param("page_poison", early_page_poison_param); +/** + * page_poisoning_enabled - check if page poisoning is enabled + * + * Return true if page poisoning is enabled, or false if not. + */ bool page_poisoning_enabled(void) { /* @@ -29,6 +34,7 @@ bool page_poisoning_enabled(void) (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC) && debug_pagealloc_enabled())); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(page_poisoning_enabled); static void poison_page(struct page *page) { -- 2.7.4