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From:   "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date:   Fri, 15 Jun 2018 15:11:15 +0200
Message-ID: <CAHmME9pBqGhCjdwx64GxYTKWiMkDNY3v2gnVL_Xm2q=3guOAsQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Lazy FPU restoration / moving kernel_fpu_end() to context switch
To:     LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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Hi Andy & folks,

Lots of crypto routines look like this:

kernel_fpu_begin();
encrypt();
kernel_fpu_end();

If you call such a routine twice, you get:

kernel_fpu_begin();
encrypt();
kernel_fpu_end();
kernel_fpu_begin();
encrypt();
kernel_fpu_end();

In a loop this looks like:

for (thing) {
  kernel_fpu_begin();
  encrypt(thing);
  kernel_fpu_end();
}

This is obviously very bad, because begin() and end() are slow, so
WireGuard does the obvious:

kernel_fpu_begin();
for (thing)
  encrypt(thing);
kernel_fpu_end();

This is fine and well, and the crypto API I'm working on will enable
this to be done in a clear way, but I do wonder if maybe this is not
something that should be happening at the level of the caller, but
rather in the fpu functions themselves. Namely, what are your thoughts
on modifying kernel_fpu_end() so that it doesn't actually restore the
state, but just reenables preemption and marks that on the next
context switch, the state should be restored? Then, essentially,
kernel_fpu_begin() and end() become free after the first usage of
kernel_fpu_begin().

Is this something feasible? I know that performance-wise, I'm really
gaining a lot from hoisting those functions out of the loops, and API
wise, it'd be slightly simpler to implement if I didn't have to all
for that hoisting.

Regards,
Jason