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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 9-v6si14913077ple.104.2018.06.18.06.24.07; Mon, 18 Jun 2018 06:24:21 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934192AbeFRNWG (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 18 Jun 2018 09:22:06 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:11773 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933182AbeFRNWC (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Jun 2018 09:22:02 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 18 Jun 2018 06:22:02 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,239,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="47945468" Received: from abyunus-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.254.89.6]) ([10.254.89.6]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 18 Jun 2018 06:22:01 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 14/17] x86/mm: Introduce direct_mapping_size To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" References: <20180612143915.68065-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20180612143915.68065-15-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <4ece14a4-27bd-e10a-4c2c-822c3e629dcd@intel.com> <20180618131247.myt6vjiav3nwww5p@black.fi.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , "H. Peter Anvin" , Tom Lendacky , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org From: Dave Hansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzShEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gPGRhdmVAc3I3MS5uZXQ+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJ CgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCTo3k0QIZAQAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsMO2D/421Xg8pimb9mPzM5N7khT0 2MCnaGssU1T59YPE25kYdx2HntwdO0JA27Wn9xx5zYijOe6B21ufrvsyv42auCO85+oFJWfE K2R/IpLle09GDx5tcEmMAHX6KSxpHmGuJmUPibHVbfep2aCh9lKaDqQR07gXXWK5/yU1Dx0r VVFRaHTasp9fZ9AmY4K9/BSA3VkQ8v3OrxNty3OdsrmTTzO91YszpdbjjEFZK53zXy6tUD2d e1i0kBBS6NLAAsqEtneplz88T/v7MpLmpY30N9gQU3QyRC50jJ7LU9RazMjUQY1WohVsR56d ORqFxS8ChhyJs7BI34vQusYHDTp6PnZHUppb9WIzjeWlC7Jc8lSBDlEWodmqQQgp5+6AfhTD kDv1a+W5+ncq+Uo63WHRiCPuyt4di4/0zo28RVcjtzlGBZtmz2EIC3vUfmoZbO/Gn6EKbYAn rzz3iU/JWV8DwQ+sZSGu0HmvYMt6t5SmqWQo/hyHtA7uF5Wxtu1lCgolSQw4t49ZuOyOnQi5 f8R3nE7lpVCSF1TT+h8kMvFPv3VG7KunyjHr3sEptYxQs4VRxqeirSuyBv1TyxT+LdTm6j4a mulOWf+YtFRAgIYyyN5YOepDEBv4LUM8Tz98lZiNMlFyRMNrsLV6Pv6SxhrMxbT6TNVS5D+6 UorTLotDZKp5+M7BTQRUY85qARAAsgMW71BIXRgxjYNCYQ3Xs8k3TfAvQRbHccky50h99TUY sqdULbsb3KhmY29raw1bgmyM0a4DGS1YKN7qazCDsdQlxIJp9t2YYdBKXVRzPCCsfWe1dK/q 66UVhRPP8EGZ4CmFYuPTxqGY+dGRInxCeap/xzbKdvmPm01Iw3YFjAE4PQ4hTMr/H76KoDbD cq62U50oKC83ca/PRRh2QqEqACvIH4BR7jueAZSPEDnzwxvVgzyeuhwqHY05QRK/wsKuhq7s UuYtmN92Fasbxbw2tbVLZfoidklikvZAmotg0dwcFTjSRGEg0Gr3p/xBzJWNavFZZ95Rj7Et db0lCt0HDSY5q4GMR+SrFbH+jzUY/ZqfGdZCBqo0cdPPp58krVgtIGR+ja2Mkva6ah94/oQN lnCOw3udS+Eb/aRcM6detZr7XOngvxsWolBrhwTQFT9D2NH6ryAuvKd6yyAFt3/e7r+HHtkU kOy27D7IpjngqP+b4EumELI/NxPgIqT69PQmo9IZaI/oRaKorYnDaZrMXViqDrFdD37XELwQ gmLoSm2VfbOYY7fap/AhPOgOYOSqg3/Nxcapv71yoBzRRxOc4FxmZ65mn+q3rEM27yRztBW9 AnCKIc66T2i92HqXCw6AgoBJRjBkI3QnEkPgohQkZdAb8o9WGVKpfmZKbYBo4pEAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQIACQUCVGPOagIbDAAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsJeCEACCh7P/aaOLKWQxcnw47p4phIVR6pVL e4IEdR7Jf7ZL00s3vKSNT+nRqdl1ugJx9Ymsp8kXKMk9GSfmZpuMQB9c6io1qZc6nW/3TtvK pNGz7KPPtaDzvKA4S5tfrWPnDr7n15AU5vsIZvgMjU42gkbemkjJwP0B1RkifIK60yQqAAlT YZ14P0dIPdIPIlfEPiAWcg5BtLQU4Wg3cNQdpWrCJ1E3m/RIlXy/2Y3YOVVohfSy+4kvvYU3 lXUdPb04UPw4VWwjcVZPg7cgR7Izion61bGHqVqURgSALt2yvHl7cr68NYoFkzbNsGsye9ft M9ozM23JSgMkRylPSXTeh5JIK9pz2+etco3AfLCKtaRVysjvpysukmWMTrx8QnI5Nn5MOlJj 1Ov4/50JY9pXzgIDVSrgy6LYSMc4vKZ3QfCY7ipLRORyalFDF3j5AGCMRENJjHPD6O7bl3Xo 4DzMID+8eucbXxKiNEbs21IqBZbbKdY1GkcEGTE7AnkA3Y6YB7I/j9mQ3hCgm5muJuhM/2Fr OPsw5tV/LmQ5GXH0JQ/TZXWygyRFyyI2FqNTx4WHqUn3yFj8rwTAU1tluRUYyeLy0ayUlKBH ybj0N71vWO936MqP6haFERzuPAIpxj2ezwu0xb1GjTk4ynna6h5GjnKgdfOWoRtoWndMZxbA z5cecg== Message-ID: Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 06:22:01 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20180618131247.myt6vjiav3nwww5p@black.fi.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 06/18/2018 06:12 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 06:37:07PM +0000, Dave Hansen wrote: >> On 06/12/2018 07:39 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: >>> Kernel need to have a way to access encrypted memory. We are going to >> "The kernel needs"... >> >>> use per-KeyID direct mapping to facilitate the access with minimal >>> overhead. >> >> What are the security implications of this approach? > > I'll add this to the message: > > Per-KeyID mappings require a lot more virtual address space. On 4-level > machine with 64 KeyIDs we max out 46-bit virtual address space dedicated > for direct mapping with 1TiB of RAM. Given that we round up any > calculation on direct mapping size to 1TiB, we effectively claim all > 46-bit address space for direct mapping on such machine regardless of > RAM size. ... I was thinking more in terms of the exposure of keeping the plaintext mapped all the time. Imagine Meltdown if the decrypted page is not mapped into the kernel: this feature could actually have protected user data. But, with this scheme, it exposes the data... all the data... with all possible keys... all the time. That's one heck of an attack surface. Can we do better? >>> struct page_ext_operations page_mktme_ops = { >>> .need = need_page_mktme, >>> }; >>> + >>> +void __init setup_direct_mapping_size(void) >>> +{ ... >>> +} >> >> Do you really need two copies of this function? Shouldn't it see >> mktme_status!=MKTME_ENUMERATED and just jump out? How is the code >> before that "goto out" different from the CONFIG_MKTME=n case? > > mktme.c is not compiled for CONFIG_MKTME=n. I'd rather have one copy in shared code which is mosty optimized away when CONFIG_MKTME=n than two copies.